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Christian Apologetics

A Series of Addresses

By

Henry Wace

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CHRISTIAN APOLOGETICS

CHRISTIAN APOLOGETICS

A SERIES OF ADDRESSES
DELIVERED BEFORE THE CHRISTIAN
ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY COLLEGE
LONDON

BY GEORGE HENSLOW, M.A. HENRY WACE, D.D.
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EDITED BY W. W. SETON, M.A.

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TO

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE LORD REAY

G.C.S.I.

PRESIDENT OF UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, LONDON

BY

THE MEMBERS OF THE UNIVERSITY

COLLEGE CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION

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PREFATORY NOTE

The interest aroused by these Addresses on Christian Apologetics, and more particularly by Lord Kelvin's speech at the first meeting, followed by the controversy in *The Times*, is, I hope, sufficient justification for their publication in book form, apart from the fact that many foreigners as well as Englishmen have expressed a desire to see them in print.

They owe their origin to the Committee of the Christian Association of University College, London, in the Botanical Theatre of which they were delivered during the Summer Term of the Session 1902-3.

Intended at first solely for the men-students of our own College, when the scheme was further developed it was determined to throw open the meetings to men and women students from all London Colleges and Hospitals.

It is our hope that other affiliated Unions of the British College Christian Union may in future pay more attention to the development of this important branch of College work; and it is satisfactory to learn that arrangements for similar courses are already being

considered in Oxford, Liverpool, and other London Colleges.

On behalf of the Committee, I take this opportunity of thanking the speakers who have kindly consented to the publication of their work, the gentlemen who assisted by presiding at the meetings, and Mr. McLaren, who has given valuable help by contributing not only the Introduction but an Appendix containing a summary of the Six Addresses, which will be found useful by students. Each contributor is responsible for his own portion only.

WALTER W. SETON,
Hon. Secretary.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION.
October, 1903.

INTRODUCTION

ON THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF CHRISTIAN EVIDENCES

By the Rev. W. D. McLaren., M.A.

It has been thought well, in introducing the following addresses to the attention of students and of the general public, to supply a bird's-eye view of the whole field of Christian Evidences, in order that the reader may the better see the proper place of each several address. This should not only enhance their value, but also suggest lines of further inquiry, and even help to strengthen or create the conviction of the rational character of Christian Faith as a whole.

The essential distinction of that Faith is that Jesus Christ is a trustworthy deliverer from the rule and consequences of evil, which in regard to God we call sin and in regard to ourselves and our fellows wrong. Personal faith is reliance on Him as such. Christian Evidences are concerned with proofs of this trustworthiness. They are not immediately directed to establish individual or systematised doctrines, which, properly speaking, are the detailed applications of this trustworthiness. Yet such doctrines or systems as

exhibit truly the mind of Christ may form matter of evidence in commending His trustworthiness. Neither are Evidences directed, as many suppose, to establish the divine origin or authority, truth or accuracy of the Bible; though it is obvious that a searching examination and comparison of the contents of the Bible must always be a large part of the matter and method of Christian Evidences, and that whatever confirms the Bible teaching generally will tend to confirm the special records dealing with the trustworthiness of Christ. Nor yet (with one great exception) are they directed to the establishment of miracles as such, nor of any special miracle. That one great exception is the Resurrection of Christ, whose trustworthiness it expresses and seals. The removal, however, of objections to miracles may well facilitate the acceptance of direct evidence. Neither are the Evidences immediately directed to faith in God, or the acknowledgment of sin, both of these being rather given in the discovery of a trustworthy Christ. Certainly, sense of the reality of God and of sin does tend to induce faith in the trustworthiness of Christ, only it is not the immediate goal of Christian Evidences.

Having thus defined their aim, we may conveniently consider their contents with reference to three questions. (1) Is that trust justified by experience as a valid working hypothesis? (2) Is the story of its origin self-consistent? (3) Is it contradicted by other known facts or truths? For practicality, self-consistency, and

general harmony, are the three tests of truth to the ordinary mind.

(1) Applying the first, we find the Christian apologist replying with a mass of data gathered from the alleged effects of trust in Christ on the lives of men in every variety of circumstance. To the individual who has experienced such effects the evidence is usually complete, at least for the time being; and to a vast number the effects in the changed lives of others, as known by observation and testimony, afford sufficient proof even where personal trust is not associated immediately with conviction. This kind of evidence is that on which the great bulk of Christian people rely. It is treated in Address IV. by Mr. Welsh, and in several of the appended speeches. The counter-argument is usually the attempt to show either that the good effects of Christianity are due to some other element than trust in Christ, or that that trust would be as effectual when exercised in an unreal as in a real Christ—that Christianity is, in short, a huge hypnotic delusion. The fact of the universality and variety of Christian experience goes far to refute this unbelieving explanation; still, the element of doubt remaining in the minds of many, who hesitate whether or no to construe even their own supposed Christian experience in a non-Christian light, forces inquiry as to the truth of the story from which Christianity takes its rise. And this is made necessary by consideration of Christian experience itself. For that experience professes to

deal, not with a speculative or made-up Christ, but with a living Christ whom it identifies with the Christ of the story; and in so far as it has been transmitted from heart to heart, it likewise obliges an inquiry into the original experience of the first Christian disciples.

(2) The evidence from the self-consistency of the Gospel story may be considered in regard to its form, its substance, and its purpose. Under consideration of form come undesigned coincidences between various narratives, the value of a measure of discrepancy as a test of the absence of collusion or artifice, traces of eye and ear witness, and the like. Under consideration of substance comes the difficulty of accounting for the admitted facts otherwise than by the alleged causes (*e.g.* the Triumphal Entry brought about by the Raising of Lazarus), and of explaining the teaching apart from the associated wonders; but the culmination of this part of the proof lies in the portraiture of the Christ Himself, which has done more than anything else to convince inquirers that it exhibited a reality and not a fiction. It is in this connection that the supreme importance of such an address as that given by Professor Margoliouth appears. Included in this class come all the refutations of unbelieving explanations of the story as due to Fable, Fraud, or Fancy, such as we find in Address VI., as well as the contrast afforded by the Apocryphal Gospels. Under consideration of the purpose come the arguments from

the fitness of Christ's alleged words, works, example, and history, to achieve the professed end of His mission —namely, the deliverance of men from sin, and their restoration to the favour and Image of God. A subordinate part of this evidence from self-consistency lies in the internal harmony of Christian doctrine, as exhibiting the trustworthiness of Christ in His various offices toward the soul and toward mankind. Such considerations also form a natural transition to the third class of evidences.

The importance of this second class lies in the conviction which it produces of the objective truth of the Gospel story and its seeming separability from the questionings which arise as to the interpretation of alleged Christian experience, one's own or others', and the study of it has both led many to personal trust in Christ and restored that trust in cases where it had been lost in puzzled introspection and philosophic uncertainty. But where the relation of the experience to the story is taken into account, the combined evidence is felt to be more convincing still: the Christ of the story makes the Christ of the heart intelligible; the Christ of the heart makes the Christ of the story credible; the experience professes the story as its origin, and the story professes the experience as its aim.

(3) There still remains a class of mind unsatisfied without the assurance which comes from perceiving the place of any alleged fact or truth in the general system of human knowledge. Even those who are usually

practically satisfied as to the reality both of the Gospel story and of their own Christian experience have intellectual inquiries and seasons of uncertainty in which the question will force itself whether Christianity be not contradicted by ascertained knowledge in other departments, and whether indeed any room be left for it in the universe as we know it. To such, Christian evidences assume the shape negatively of refuting objections drawn from other knowledge and positively of showing the harmony of Christianity with it.

The importance of the first Address, by Professor Henslow, will be apparent at this point, and a considerable portion of Dean Wace's Address touches on this department of the subject. Professor Henslow endeavours to set aside the alleged contradiction between the Christian doctrine of a Creator and our knowledge of the evolution of life, while Dean Wace indicates the harmony of history with the first of those Jewish books which the Christ of the Gospels has irrevocably endorsed. Similar considerations deal with the correspondence of the vital portions of Old Testament narrative, of the Acts of the Apostles, and above all of the Gospels, with the historical conditions of their respective ages. Here we accordingly meet the evidence derived from the fields of Old Testament and New Testament textual and historical criticism, and the controversies thence arising. Further, these considerations assume a philosophical aspect in the attempt to show that the Course

of History not only requires the admission of the Gospel story as the rise of modern life, but that it acquires in the light of Christianity a meaning and a goal supplied by nothing else. Again we may take the Course of Nature, and try to show that its ordinary sequences indicative of the divine faithfulness, regularity, and holiness, do not exclude the extraordinary occurrences of the Christian's Faith which correlatively indicate the superabundance of the divine mercy. Nature is shown to be no rigid machine, but the plastic sacramental material alike of its Maker's law and of His grace. Similarly the Course of Philosophical Thought may be shown to harmonise with the Gospel. Under this head come such discussions as those in the fifth Address, by Mr. Manley, as well as the consideration of other religions and philosophic systems. We find the undesigned combination of the best elements of these in Christianity, and on the other hand a marked contrast between their doctrines of self-deliverance and despair and the doctrine of deliverance by Christ. The moral fitness of the Gospel for human need and the supreme knowledge of the heart alike of God and of man which it affords constitute its ultimate philosophical justification, and naturally lead the mind round again to the question of individual experience of its power, thus uniting the persuasion of the intellect with the appeal to the conscience and the heart.

The Resurrection of Christ (dealt with in the sixth Address by Mr. Wilson), may be said to focus and

symbolise all the various forms of evidence and to touch points arising out of each of the other addresses. It is the beginning and origin of those supra-sensible influences which constitute Christian experience. It is the consummation of the Christian story in its form, substance, and purpose. It is the supreme event in the world's history—the seal of the divine origin and serviceability of Nature, and the answer to the inquiries of the philosopher and the cravings of the heart as to the meaning and destiny of man and the character of God. For in it Christ is seen as the Life and the Life-Giver.

It will thus be seen that the addresses are given in an order the reverse of that just set forth: they open with the great question of Theism, proceed to the written records first of the original and then of the fully developed divine revelation, and next examine the Christian experience which it has created, recurring in Address V. to the Atheistic position as the true alternative of Christianity. The sixth Address, by Mr. Wilson, rebutting disbelieving explanations of the Resurrection, confronts us with the final question of personal experiment.

From the comprehensiveness of this general scheme it will appear how much the force of the Evidences may depend upon the presentation to each individual of that portion of the argument appropriate to his temperament, condition, and need. Some Protestant Christians might here wisely learn from their Jesuit

brethren. Exclusive emphasis on experimental evidence, for example, will but irritate instead of helping one who rightly demands or needs the historical; while the historical evidence cannot satisfy the philosophic inquirer, nor the philosophic avail one bent upon practical satisfaction. The wise apologist will adapt his arguments to the need of his fellow rather than to his own preference for a particular line of thought. Christian apologists in special departments are even found flouting each other's efforts instead of rejoicing in them, and many earnest Christians under colour of appeal to heart and conscience affect to despise reasoning altogether. The remarkable successes of the "evidential missions" of the Christian Evidence Society witness to the advantage of the acknowledgment of the proper place of the intellect in Christian faith, and the mutual dependence of the various departments of Christian Evidences. On the part of students even the most suitable presentation may be repelled by prejudice, sometimes intellectual, as when some special theory of Science or Philosophy is allowed to bar out any counter considerations, sometimes moral, as from an unwillingness to submit to the claims of Christ if established. On the inquirers' part a keen sense of the realities of God and of sin will on the other hand dispose toward acceptance of the offered forgiveness, renewal, and deathlessness: the hungry man is legitimately ready to satisfy his craving when there is even tolerable presumption that what is offered him is not

poison but good food. The determined seeker will also do well to remember that the evidence he needs to produce faith is perhaps to be found just in that very department which he is prone to overlook, or has but superficially examined. Carelessness or prejudice here prolongs dubiety in many cases.

The study of the aim and contents of Christian Evidences leads us, in conclusion, to observe their constitution. Their force is such as amply to justify the experiment of a personal reliance on Christ for deliverance as the supremely rational act of the soul; yet insufficient to compel intellectual assent without the experiment. Otherwise, with too little evidence, the venture would be irrational if not immoral, and, with overwhelming evidence, the mere assent would bear no moral significance. Christ Himself is thus at once the subject and the object of Christian Evidences, and becomes the test as He professes to be the judge of spiritual character. He offers Himself for individual acceptance, and it is in the expectation that some may be led upon careful inquiry to make this supreme venture that the Christian Association of University College, London, has arranged and now publishes these lectures.

August, 1903.

PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

WITH

AN EXAMINATION OF DARWINISM

By the Rev. Prof. G. Henslow, M.A., F.L.S., F.G.S., etc.[1]

Present-day Rationalism is presumably displayed in the various publications issued by the "Rationalist Press Association."[2] These cover a large field of enquiry. It would be quite impossible to discuss all the subjects treated by the various authors; but there is one which distinguishes present-day Rationalism from the older Secularism of the "seventies," when Mr. Bradlaugh was a conspicuous figure; and this is, that some, at least, of the writers attribute all phenomena of living beings, including Man, whether physical or psychological, to Natural Selection.

Darwin's *Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection* was published in 1859; and the Secularists of that day make no use of natural selection in their writings on Free Thought, etc.; which generally included a refusal to accept any ecclesiastical dogmas of theology, and an agnostic attitude towards a belief in God. Thus Mr. Bradlaugh wrote:—

"An atheist does not say, 'There is no God'; but he says, 'I know not what you mean by God. I am

[1] Epitome of an address delivered May 1st, 1903.

[2] Founded in 1899.

without idea of God. The word God is to me a sound conveying no clear or distinct affirmation.'" [1]

The primary aim of modern rationalism, as represented by the R.P.A., is as follows :—

"The chief objects of the Association are the encouragement and dissemination of literature based upon science and critical research, and tending at once to the liberation of human reason from mere tradition and to its proper exercise on the growing material of knowledge, etc."

The following is given as a definition of Rationalism :—

"Rationalism may be defined as the mental attitude which unreservedly accepts the supremacy of reason, and aims at establishing a system of philosophy and ethics verifiable by experience and independent of all arbitrary assumptions or authority."

So far, this is a sound, scientific attitude, and no one can find fault with these aims and this definition ; but the question arises—Do the authors of the books issued by this Association act up to these aims or conform to this definition ? Do they never rest on "arbitrary assumptions" or unquestioned "authority" ?

As the writers base their agnosticism—and in some cases their pronounced atheism, as, *e.g.*, Haeckel, upon Darwinism—it becomes necessary to examine that theory ; and that is why I have added it to the title of this address.

The following are a few quotations from a typical rationalistic writer who attributes everything to natural selection.

[1] *A Plea for Atheism,* p. 2.

The anonymous author of *Mr. Balfour's Apologetics*, speaking of "Science," says :—

"Science courts the most rigorous investigation," and "lays bare the natural causes of all phenomena."

It has not succeeded in doing so for the cause of terrestrial life, the cause of chemical affinities, and many other things.

"Science remains firmly planted on the impregnable ground of experience," for "knowledge can only be gained by means of observation corrected and verified by experiments."

I wish particularly to call attention to the fact that knowledge based on *Inductive evidence* is, in the case of this writer, conspicuous by its absence. If "observation and experiment" were the sole means of acquiring knowledge, the greater part of recognised scientific conclusions would have to be abandoned. Thus, no one now disputes the "fact" that the rotation of the earth on its axis gives us day and night; but "observation" of the sun apparently supports the opposite conclusion. It is solely accepted on inductive evidence, *i.e.* the accumulation of probabilities of a very high order which furnishes a moral conviction of the truth, and is equivalent to a demonstration, rendering the alternative—that the sun and stars travel round the earth in twenty-four hours—absolutely unthinkable. The truth of the earth's rotation does not lie within the range of "observation and experiment."

Similarly, when this writer asks for proofs of the existence of God, he says :—

"Science neither affirms nor denies the existence of God. . . . The so-called knowledge [of God] must be

submitted to the tests of observation and experiment. If it is knowledge at all, it is capable of verification, and the verdict of science on the subject must be final."[1]

"No man hath seen God at any time." How can the knowledge of Him be brought within the range of observation and experiment? But as science is perfectly satisfied with inductive evidence where these are impossible, Rationalists are inconsistent in not accepting it as a proof of the existence of a Creator; for the accumulation of probabilities of an Omnipotent Mind behind nature is as great as or far greater than, say, *e.g.*, the coincidences between the absorption bands in the solar spectrum and the corresponding coloured bands of vapourised metals, etc.; yet, all physicists are perfectly willing to accept the probability of our metals being in the sun itself as a fact, though they have not a chance of submitting the incandescent vapours of that luminary to observation and experiment.

It is said that believers have faith in God. "Faith is the proving of things not seen," according to the writer to the Hebrews (R.V.), and this is precisely what is called inductive evidence in science.

English Rationalists seem to be mainly, like Bradlaugh, agnostics. They do not say "there is no God," but what are regarded by theists as sufficient "proofs" do not seem to appeal to them as any evidence; and the reason, we shall see, is that they accept Darwinism as accountable for everything.

Thus, when the author of *Mr. Balfour's Apologetics* is discussing human psychology, he uses natural

[1] P. 102.

selection as a general instrument to explain all mental phenomena. For example :—

"The capacity of the human intellect is in conformity with what we might expect, on the theory that it has been evolved for practical purposes by the process of natural selection."[1]

"Reason is the 'roof and crown of things'; it is the final result of a long process of natural selection." But it does not fall within the scope of "observation and experiment."[2]

The latest writer on natural selection, however, says :—

"Man is an unsatisfactory organism in which to determine either the existence or non-existence of natural selection."[3]

If it be asked why these rationalistic writers lay so much stress upon natural selection, the answer seems to be that—setting aside their own definition—they accept Darwinism as an established fact, and Darwin as an "authority," because they know no other source of interpretation of all the phenomena of living beings.

Let us now turn to Haeckel as illustrating the materialistic or, as he calls it, the monistic position. Unlike agnostics, he says :—

"Atheism affirms that there are no gods nor goddesses. This godless world-system substantially agrees with monism or pantheism. Dualism breaks up the

[1] P. 87.

[2] P. 93.

[3] *Variation in Animals and Plants*, by Dr. H. M. Vernon, p. 349.

universe into two entirely distinct substances—the material world and the immaterial God. . . . Monism recognises one sole substance, which is at once 'God and Nature.' Body and spirit or matter and energy it holds to be inseparable."[1]

In regard to materialistic monism, as do Rationalists, he treats Darwinism as fundamentally the interpretation of all phenomena:—

"Darwin gave us the key to the monistic explanation of organism. . . . Mechanism alone can give us a true explanation of natural phenomena; for it traces them to their real efficient causes—viz. to blind and unconscious agencies."[2]

"Kant said: 'It is impossible to explain the origin of a single blade of grass by natural laws uncontrolled by design.' Seventy years afterwards Darwin achieved the task which Kant deemed impracticable."[3]

Similarly, Büchner says:—

"Darwinism is the chief support of materialism and monism."[4]

Was this Darwin's own view? In the sixth edition of the *Origin of Species, etc.* (with additions and corrections to 1872, published in 1878) the final words are as follows:—

"There is grandeur in this view of life, with its several powers, having been originally breathed by the Creator into a few forms or into one; and that whilst this planet has gone cycling on according to the fixed

[1] *Riddle of the Universe,* p. 20.
[2] *Op. cit.* pp. 264 and 265.
[3] *Op. cit.* p. 265.
[4] *Last Words on Materialism,* p. 139.

law of gravity, from so simple a beginning, endless forms most beautiful and most wonderful have been, and are being, evolved."[1]

In his *Descent of Man* (1871) he also wrote :—

"The birth both of species and of the individual are equally parts of that grand sequence of events which our minds refuse to accept as the result of blind chance."[2]

Compare these last words with those I have quoted from Haeckel—*viz.* "blind and unconscious agencies."

A noticeable feature soon becomes apparent in the writings of Darwinians and Rationalists, in that they often far "out-darwin" Darwin himself in their applications of natural selection.

His works on the *Origin of Species, etc.*, and *Animals and Plants under Domestication* are solely concerned with the evolution of living organisms, which he bases on two postulates—(1) the original creation of a few or one primitive being; and (2) the existence of variations, without which, he says, natural selection can do nothing.[3] If these postulates be granted, natural selection would be accountable for Evolution.

But some writers would endeavour to account for the various internal tissues as resulting from natural selection; and not only man's mental phenomena, but even death itself as coming under its sway.

M. Léon A. Dumont observed that on the acceptance of Darwin's theory in Germany :—

"Non seulement on l'adopta pour les sciences

[1] *Origin of Species*, p. 429.
[2] Vol. ii., p. 396.
[3] *Origin, etc.*, p. 64.

naturelles, mais on essaya de l'étendre aux faits les plus divers, à la science du langage, à la formation des facultés intellectuelles, à la politique, à la morale, à l'histoire, à la théorie du progrès. Le darwinisme et ses applications ont donné naissance dans ce pays à toute une littérature."[1]

With regard to man, Darwin's work on his *Descent* is mainly concerned with the evolution of his body from the lower animals, and only observes of his psychology :—

"The moral qualities are advanced, either directly or indirectly, much more through the effects of habit, the reasoning powers, instruction, religion, etc., than through natural selection."[2]

The author of *Mr. Balfour's Apologetics*, however, refers man's senses, reason, æsthetic powers, etc., unhesitatingly to natural selection. But, besides basing human psychology on natural selection we have seen that Haeckel and Büchner base their atheistic materialism on Darwinism, in spite of Darwin's own express assertions of his belief in a Creator, as seen in the passages referred to.[3]

We must now enter upon an examination of Darwinism, from which Evolution must be carefully distinguished. The latter now stands on an irrefragable basis. The evidence is largely inductive, but supplemented by a vast amount of "observation and

[1] *Haeckel et la Théorie de l'Évolution en Allemagne,* p. 36 (1873).

[2] *The Descent of Man,* vol. ii., p. 404.

[3] *Origin of Species,* pp. 146, 429; *Descent of Man,* vol. ii., p. 396.

experiment"; so that any alternative is at the present day unthinkable.

Darwinism was a theory to account for the process of Evolution, and is expressed by the title of the book, *The Origin of Species by means of Natural Selection.*

Darwin tells us that it was suggested to his mind by reading Malthus' *Essay on Population.* In this work the author observes that, as the human race multiplies at a geometrical progression, but their food supply increases at an arithmetical one,[1] a time must come when some must die for want of food, in any given limited area at least. Hence the weak and sickly, the diseased and impoverished, etc., will go first, as being, so to say, naturally eliminated, while the strong and rich will be naturally selected.

Now applying this theory to animals and plants, Darwin's first datum is that they have an enormous birth-rate with a nearly equal death-rate; because in any definite area the average of its inhabitants is annually maintained.

The causes of the deaths are various. A large proportion of offspring, as eggs of fishes, are eaten by others. Ill-luck, or, as Darwin calls it, "fortuitous destruction," is accountable for many losses among the offspring.

With regard to plants, well nourished seeds grow

[1] It is beside my present question to enquire how he drew this conclusion, but the process is not quite clear; since cultivated plants, as wheat, and domesticated animals multiply in a high geometrical progression, as well as man. But, in a limited area, say England, which was supposed to supply its population without any foreign assistance, the population will increase but the area does not; and if this be fully cultivated, it can only supply a fixed quantity of animal and vegetable food.

into more vigorous plants and crowd out the weaker ones. In fact, "the struggle for existence" is intense, not only between competing animals and plants, but with the surrounding physical conditions, etc. The general consequence is that the average number only survives.

But the survival of the strongest and luckiest has nothing to do with the appearance of new *Variations of Structure* which form the basis of a new *Variety*; for such are due to other causes than those which enable the survivals to be the "fittest to survive."

If this process be natural selection, then natural selection has no *power* or *agency* in the procedure at all, as so many writers say. It is, as Darwin insisted, only a metaphor. Thus he writes:—

"Some have even imagined that natural selection induces variability, whereas it implies only the preservation of such variations as arise and are beneficial to the being under its conditions of life. . . . Others have objected that as plants have no volition, natural selection is not applicable to them! In the literal sense of the word, no doubt, natural selection is a false term; but who ever objected to chemists speaking of the elective affinities of the various elements? . . . It has been said that I speak of natural selection as an active power or Deity; but who objects to an author speaking of the attraction of gravity as ruling the movements of the planets? Every one knows what is meant and is implied by such metaphorical expressions, etc." [1]

Darwin's first and fundamental mistake was to introduce *the element of Structure* or *Form* into *Malthus' theory*; a feature with which he was not concerned at

[1] *Origin of Species*, p. 63.

all. It has never been shown that slight changes of structure or form, or what are called "Individual Differences," have anything to do either with the death or survival of individuals.[1]

Darwin's second mistake was to regard "Individual Differences"[2] as a source of varieties in nature.

These differences arise from the fact, that no two animals or plants of any species are absolutely alike. For example, no two leaves on a tree are identical in shape, as if they were cut out together like stamped "fish-papers." No two peas in a pod are absolutely alike. All such differences are neglected by systematists because they are wanting in the two essential features of varieties and species; namely, *a sufficient amount of difference* to justify the use of the terms "variation" and "variety"; and *hereditary constancy.*

Dr. A. R. Wallace distinguishes between "specific" and "non-specific or developmental characters":

"The latter [corresponding to Individual Differences] "are due to the laws which determine the growth and development of the organism, and therefore rarely coincide exactly with the limits of a species."[3]

It is not difficult to see how Darwin came to look to individual differences as a source of variations. It was because he based his theory on observation upon plants under cultivation and upon domesticated animals; and far less, if at all, upon wild plants and animals. Thus, *e.g.*, let us take the radish. We find that as a wild plant it is constant in form and has no varieties,

[1] I am not alluding to malformations, but such changes as a systematist requires for describing a new variety.

[2] *Origin of Species,* p. 34.

[3] *Fortnightly Review,* March, 1895, p. 444.

but under cultivation in an artificially prepared soil, the root has become spindle-shaped or globular; and by careful selection of the seed, several "forms" are now hereditary. All such may be called "exaggerated" individual differences, but not "varieties."[1]

Carrots, cabbages, Shirley poppies, etc., supply analogous instances. Hence Darwin said:—

"Seeing that variations useful to man have undoubtedly occurred, can it be thought improbable that other variations useful . . . in the great and complex battle of life should occur . . . ?"[2]

On the next page he observes, "Changes in the conditions of life give a tendency to increased variability. . . . Unless such profitable variations occur, natural selection can do nothing." The wild carrot, cabbage, field poppy, for example, have produced no wild varieties at all; although not a single individual plant, it may be presumed, has not had individual differences. Let the plant be transferred to some markedly different surroundings, or into "changed conditions of life," then certain individual differences may become pronounced. Thus the Lesser Celandine (*Ranunculus Ficaria*) never varies (in the systematist's eye) in England, but it grows to a large size in Malta and has been called var. *Calthæfolia*; but then, as the Maltese plants are all alike, natural selection has had nothing to select from.

Many observers, accepting Darwin's "individual differences" as supplying materials for the origin of

[1] I say this, though Darwin included mere individual differences under the term "variations" (*Origin of Species*, p. 64).

[2] *Op. cit.* p. 63.

species, have examined hundreds, in some cases thousands, of individuals of the same kind, and represented the differences seen in any selected organ, such as the sepals and petals of the lesser celandine, length or breadth of the carapace of crabs, earwigs, shrimps, etc., in curves with maxima and minima. But these only show that the processes of growth are never absolutely identical in any organ, depending probably on accidental differences in nourishment. The important question arises, *will they lead to the discovery of the Origin of Varieties?*

As far as I can discover, the observers are not always careful to look first for "changed conditions of life"; but collect their individual specimens from one and the same locality. Secondly, they seem to forget that no character is of any importance for classification unless it has hereditary constancy. These two fundamental conditions for varieties do not seem to be sufficiently attended to in every case, if at all in some instances.

A correspondent informs me that he has found that the number of ray florets in the S. European species of Marygold varies according to their habitats. Thus 21 is the typical number; but near the sea it rises to 26 ($= 2 \times 13$) and 34. The ox-eye daisy has generally 21 ray florets at Lake Como; but at an altitude of 400 to 500 feet it develops during the height of the flowering season 34, reverting to 21 at the end of the season.

The changes are obviously due to "changed conditions of life." Of course, these numbers are readily accounted for by the principles of phyllotaxis.

The second of Darwin's supposed sources of variations

was what he called "indefinite" variations.[1] He thought that when seeds or young animals grew up under changed conditions of life, the rule was, they varied "indefinitely"; that is to say, in several ways, some assuming favourable variations, others injurious ones. The result was that a few were naturally selected, and the rest died. Neither Darwin nor any Darwinian has ever brought forward any illustration, to the best of my knowledge, of such indefinite variations among wild plants or animals in nature.

Moreover, supposing that there were such indefinite variations, the struggle for existence occurs in infancy; that is, long before any varietal or specific characters, as a rule, make their appearance, in plants at least. Thus, if pear trees were raised from seed, the struggle must take place and the survivors be determined years before any varietal character can be seen in the flowers of fruits; so that this proves that it is not points of structure or form upon which life and death depend.

If it be asserted that there is some correlation between the new varietal characters in the pears (which may not be borne until ten years after the pips were sown) and the survival during infancy years before, I am not aware of any evidence ever having been brought forward to sustain this idea.

Darwin would draw an analogy between man's selection and natural selection; but the two processes are diametrically opposite in character; for man selects by *isolating* the individual he wishes to preserve, and he does not allow it to have any struggle at all. In

[1] *Animals and Plants under Domestication*, vol. ii., p. 272; *Origin of Species, etc.*, pp. 6, 106.

nature, the survival is supposed to result from an *intense struggle* for existence. But nature has not two methods of making varieties, as far as we know.

Again, natural selection is often spoken of, by writers, as an "agent," or as possessing "power." [1] It has really nothing of the sort. It is like a "natural law," which is really no "law" at all, but only a phrase indicating anything which always happens under similar circumstances.

Natural selection stands for the following fact. Too many creatures are born for all to be able to live. That is a natural law, so the majority die and the few survive. That is all. The causes of the death of the many and the reasons why a few survive can be known; but natural selection is only, as Darwin insisted, a metaphor to express that fact.

Thus, for example, when an epidemic seizes a district, one in one family, two in another, etc., are attacked and die. Others may or may not be attacked and survive. Such is natural selection among human beings. The cause of attack is pathological microbes. The reason why some survive is that they possess constitutions strong enough to resist the attack. Natural selection is only the Registrar!

It has, therefore, yet to be shown that a change of form which can be sufficient to be called varietal ever causes death; or, on the other hand, can be credited with the power to secure survival.

It is necessary now to show how it came about that Darwinism is regarded as the main support of atheistic monism. Darwin's illustration of the origin of species

[1] Darwin repudiated this idea, as we have seen.

by means of natural selection will quite account for it. He said :—

"If an architect were to rear a noble and commodious edifice, without the use of cut stone, by selecting from the fragments at the base of a precipice wedge-shaped stones for his arches, elongated stones for his lintels, and flat stones for his roof, we should admire his skill and regard him as the paramount power. Now the fragments of stone, though indispensable to the architect, bear to the edifice built by him the same relation which the fluctuating variations of each organic being bear to the varied and admirable structures ultimately acquired by its modified descendants."[1]

It is impossible, however, to build a "noble edifice" out of such materials, especially as Darwin provides nothing in the way of mortar. No one (as Mr. Herbert Spencer says) except the most primitive men ever built a house with undressed stone.

But the point to be especially noted is that the stones bear, not "the same," but *no relation at all* to the requirements of the house, since they are not prepared in any way for it. Similarly, the "fluctuating favourable variations" which happen to arise *bear no relation* to the organism's requirements, according to Darwin. Hence there is *no Natural Law* connecting such variations with the adaptive form of the being.

It is always the presence of "law and order" in nature which appeals to man as evidence of Mind and not "blind chance"; and if Darwinism were true, then monistic atheism might, perhaps, have some reasonable basis for it.

Similarly, Darwin's elaborate explanation of how he

[1] *Animals and Plants under Domestication,* vol. ii., p. 430.

supposed an eye might have come into existence by means of natural selection, required something more than a score of imaginary suppositions, all of which have to be also accounted for, presumably by natural selection. The following is his description, in which I have italicised the suppositions :—

"If we must compare the eye to an optical instrument (writes Darwin) we ought in imagination to take a *thick layer* of *transparent tissue*, with *spaces filled with fluid*, and with a *nerve sensitive to light beneath*, and then suppose *every part of this layer to be continually changing slowly in density*, so as to *separate into layers of different densities* and *thicknesses*, *placed at different distances* from each other, and with the *surfaces* of each layer *slowly changing in form.* Further we must suppose that there is a *power* represented by natural selection or the survival of the fittest, always *intently watching* each slight alteration in the transparent layers; and *carefully preserving* each which, under *varied circumstances*, in any way or any degree, *tends to produce a distincter image.* We must suppose each new state of the instrument *to be multiplied by the million;* each *to be preserved* until a *better one* is produced, and then the *old ones to be all destroyed.* Let this *process go on for millions of years:* and during each year on *millions of individuals* of *many kinds;* and may we not believe that a living optical instrument might thus be formed as superior to one of glass, as the works of the Creator are to those of man?"[1]

Huxley described Darwinism as a method of "trial and error"; but such a description is totally inapplicable to all other departments of nature. There is nothing of the sort in the laws of gravity, heat,

[1] *Origin of Species, etc.*, p. 146.

electricity, etc.; why then should it occur when the noblest efforts are made in the construction of myriads of living beings, in giving them perfect adaptations to their conditions of life, including man himself?

It is scarcely to be wondered at that Darwinism should have been regarded as a death-blow to Theism.

Herein, then, will be seen the absolute necessity of showing the fallacies of Darwinism in any attempt to expose the irrationality of Rationalists and Haeckelian or materialistic monists.

What then is the alternative to Darwinism to account for evolution? I will call it the "True Darwinism," because Darwin himself gave it us, as well as natural selection.

Euclid bases his propositions on axioms, and True Darwinism is founded on two such axioms.

The first is "Variability"—that is, the capacity or power in all organisms to vary in internal structure and external form.

Secondly, there is a power residing in protoplasm and the nucleus, which can *respond* to external influences. They can by means of this power construct cells, tissues and organs in response to, and direct adaptation to the conditions of life.

Darwin thus describes the process:—

"The direct action of changed conditions leads to definite or indefinite results. . . . In the former case the nature of the organism is such that it yields readily when subjected to certain conditions, and all, or nearly all, the individuals become modified in the same way."[1]

[1] *Origin of Species*, p. 106.

"A new sub-variety would be formed without the aid of natural selection."[1]

The important point to notice is that we here have a *Natural Law governing the relationship between the variations which arise and the changed conditions of life.*

As all the individuals vary alike in response to them, there is nothing for natural selection to do. The "indefinite results" to which he alludes are really non-existent. *There are only definite ones.*

Of course, the majority of the individuals (that is, the offspring of any species submitted to new conditions) die, and the few survive. That may be called the proper sphere of natural selection; but this fact has nothing to do with the *new varietal characters*, which both the dead and the living possessed alike.

If Darwin was right in supposing the Creator to have breathed life into a single form, or to have made a speck of protoplasm with its nucleus—and it is, at present, perfectly inconceivable how such a complicated structure as that of a nucleus could otherwise have come into existence[2]—then that speck was sufficient to evolve the whole of the vegetable and animal worlds, inclusive of man, past, present and future. If we reflect on this phenomenon, we discover that protoplasm is endowed with a practically creative omnipotence!

To most minds such an astounding fact would be sufficient of itself as an infallible witness to an Omniscient Power behind nature.

[1] *Animals and Plants under Domestication*, vol. ii., p. 271.

[2] There are plenty of *theories* to account for the origin of protoplasm from pre-existing lifeless matter.

Coupled with this universal power there is as universal a "Directivity" which utilises the chemico-physical forces by which all creatures are made; but these alone cannot account for adaptations in organic structures.

The whole of Evolution is thus worked out on those two axiomatic principles or natural laws.

Darwin came to realise the great importance of the "direct action" of the environment in 1876 as the prime cause or interpretation of Evolution. He thus wrote to Professor Wagner of Munich:—

"The greatest mistake I made was, I now think, that I did not attach weight to the direct influence of food, climate, etc., quite independently of natural selection. When I wrote my book—and for some years later—I could not find a good proof of the direct action of the environment on the species. Such proofs are now plentiful." [1]

Of course, they were as "plentiful" in 1859 as in 1876. But in fact they are *universal.* In other words, it is a Natural Law.

It will now be seen that the "True Darwinism," or the Law of Adaptation, is the true and only interpretation of Evolution, and replaces the old argument of Design. This presumed that the Deity proceeded on similar lines to those of a manufacturer or artificer, who first conceives an idea; he then designs and draws out a plan, and finally constructs the mechanism in accordance with it.

Similarly, it was thought that all adaptations in plants and animals were preconceived before their creation.

Evolution reverses this process. Nothing is ever made, *at first*, in anticipation of its use or requirement.

[1] Quoted by Büchner, *Op. cit.*, p. 194; see also Darwin's "Life."

The necessary structure is evolved by the responsive action of the being to its environment. In the case of animals, effort and use are the means of securing muscular and other organs[1]; while the eye has been slowly evolved by the direct action of light on sensitive protoplasm under Directivity.

This universal process of self-adaptation to the environmental forces—"without the aid of natural selection," as Darwin says—appeals far more strongly to one's mind as undoubted evidence of a Divine, Creative Power or Mind, than Design could ever possibly do.[2]

The belief, therefore, in a Creator is based on a vast collection of individual probabilities, of so high an order that, to any mind receptive of inductive evidence, and not gratuitously limited to "observation and experiment," the proofs are simply overwhelming.

Postscript.

It appears from a discussion in the *Times* and elsewhere concerning Lord Kelvin's utterances at University College, on May 1st, that while one writer thinks his Lordship is not competent to speak on

[1] An interesting case of "direct action" of use and "protoplasmic response" occurred in a patient of St. Bartholomew's Hospital. A guard of the Metropolitan Railway had his elbow crushed. The bones were excised, and he returned to his duties. As he often had to reach his compartment after the train had started, he was in the habit of swinging himself along the footboard by means of the bars outside the carriages. In response to this effort Nature provided him with a *perfectly efficient joint* in lieu of the excised bones; but what the actual structure was, is unknown.

[2] I would refer the reader for further particulars to my little book, *The Argument of Adaptation:* Williams and Norgate. (1*s.*)

Biology, others state that all references to a Deity are beyond the province of science.

This latter is undoubtedly true in the ordinary application of the word. Science observes, experiments, and draws logical conclusions from inductive evidence, when experiment is impossible, from the purely physical and observable facts of nature.

Darwin's alternative theory to natural selection—*viz.* the origin of variations by the definite action of the environment—is deducible from a "plentiful" supply of facts, to quote his word. That conclusion was a purely scientific one.

But beyond all that science can teach, there are obvious phenomena which, as other contributors to the discussion point out, science cannot touch. Such is the cause of the responsive power of protoplasm, by means of which new variations come into existence.

There is "something" in living things which will not apply to a crystal. The molecules of alum or other mineral always have assumed and always do assume the same forms. But it is not necessarily so with animals and plants. There is a "Directivity"[1] in both cases, but with a difference.

[1] I am indebted to Professor A. H. Church, F.R.S., for this very useful and expressive word. It seems a better one than Jas. Croll's "Determining Power," described in his paper, *What Determines Molecular Motion, the Fundamental Problem of Nature?* Professor Church writes me, "I coined it many years ago to avoid the use of 'force,' 'energy,' etc., when describing in lectures on Organic Chemistry the parallelism between the chemist *directing* in his laboratory physico-chemical forces in the making of a true organic compound, and that mysterious "something" which employs the same forces to make the same compound in the plant or animal."

It is this "something" in the living world which is superadded to the purely chemico-physical forces. Whence did it come? Thus, when we run through the history of life on this world, we see, not merely individual differences or even variations, but wonderful adaptations of all sorts, as the result of this responsiveness under directivity.

Then we look to ourselves, and discover that man makes adaptations, too, for his wants; sometimes copying the contrivances of nature, sometimes finding out afterwards that nature has forestalled him.

He knows that his works are the result of intelligence; therefore he concludes that nature's are also the issue of intelligence; but *how* they come about is a mystery past finding out.

But while Man is obliged to conceive and design before he begins to make his works of art, nature's works come by a process of self-adjusting evolution; but only when the "direct action" of the environment calls forth the responsive power of protoplasm, which then sets to work to build up the structure required. This is a strictly logical conclusion, based on "plentiful" inductive evidence.

The whole of the phenomena of living structures may be conformable to natural laws, and by natural means—chemico-physical, if you like; but, try to ignore it as much as they can, biologists are bound to admit that certain phenomena of life escape their powers of "observation and experiment"; and the origin of variations is one of them.

There is nothing "abnormal," as a writer hints, in "directivity," from the behaviour of a nucleus in a protoplasmic cell to the Evolution of Man.

Directivity is a universal natural law, everywhere present. It is even a matter of experiment as well as observation; for it at once becomes evident under cultivation and domestication.

Titles are of little account, but what is meant by them is of importance. The old terms "vital spirits," "anima animans," "vis medicatrix," etc., were no doubt defective; but there is a certain truth underlying them which Biology cannot reach. Take *vis medicatrix*: can biology explain by purely chemico-physical forces *why* a wound heals at all?

"Forces" are unknowable in themselves, and can only be recognised by their individual effects, as electricity, magnetism, etc. Then—as Jas. Croll said of the phenomena of life, which are also only recognisable by their peculiar effects—it is as justifiable to regard them as due to "vital" force, as to speak of electrical or magnetic forces. Here Lord Kelvin agrees with him.

If you cannot bring reproduction with heredity under chemico-physical forces alone, why hesitate to call them "vital" forces, acting under a Directivity which guides the protoplasmic molecules so as to construct a baby?

Scientists may say that all this is outside their province. It may be so; but why may not philosophy enter the field which science will not invade?

The following were Lord Kelvin's remarks which gave rise to the numerous communications to the *Times* and elsewhere.

LORD KELVIN'S SPEECH.

With reference to Professor Henslow's mention of ether-granules, I ask permission to say three words of

personal explanation. I had recently, at a meeting of the Royal Society of Edinburgh, occasion to make use of the expressions ether, atoms, electricity; and I was horrified to read in the Press that I had put forward a hypothesis of ether-atoms. Ether is absolutely non-atomic; it is structureless, and utterly homogeneous where not disturbed by the atoms of ponderable matter.

I am in thorough sympathy with Professor Henslow in the fundamentals of his lecture; but I cannot admit that, with regard to the origin of life, science neither affirms nor denies Creative Power.[1] Science positively affirms Creative Power. It is not in dead matter that we live and move and have our being, but in the creating and directing power which science compels us to accept as an article of belief. We cannot escape from that conclusion, when we study the physics and dynamics of living and dead matter all around. Modern biologists are coming, I believe, once more to a firm acceptance of something beyond mere gravitational, chemical, and physical forces; and that unknown thing is a vital principle. We have an unknown object put before us in science. In thinking of that object we are all agnostics. We only know God in His works, but we are absolutely forced by science to believe with perfect confidence in a Directive Power—in an influence other than physical, or dynamical, or electrical forces. Cicero, by some supposed to have been editor of Lucretius, denied that men and plants and animals could come into existence by a fortuitous concourse of atoms. There is nothing between absolute scientific belief in a Creative Power and the acceptance of the theory of a fortuitous concourse of atoms. Just think of a number of atoms falling together of their own

[1] Lord Kelvin has inadvertently attributed to me what I was quoting from the author of *Mr. Balfour's Apologetics* (see page 3).—(G. H.)

accord, and making a crystal, a sprig of moss, a microbe, a living animal. Cicero's expression, "fortuitous concourse of atoms," is not wholly inappropriate for the growth of a crystal. But modern scientific men are wholly in agreement with him in condemning it as utterly absurd in respect to the coming into existence, or the growth, or the continuation of molecular combinations presented in the bodies of living things. Here scientific thought is compelled to accept the idea of Creative Power. Forty years ago I asked Liebig, walking somewhere in the country, if he believed that the grass and flowers that we saw around us grew by mere chemical forces. He answered, "No; no more than I could believe that a book of botany describing them could grow by mere chemical forces." Every action of human free will is a miracle to physical and chemical and mathematical science.

I admire the healthy, breezy atmosphere of free thought throughout Professor Henslow's lecture. Do not be afraid of being free thinkers. If you think strongly enough you will be forced by science to the belief in God, which is the foundation of all religion. You will find science not antagonistic but helpful to religion.

In conclusion, I have the pleasure to move a hearty vote of thanks to Professor Henslow for the interesting and instructive lecture which we have heard.

THE BOOK OF GENESIS

By the Dean of Canterbury (Very Rev. Henry Wace, D.D.)[1]

There is one point respecting the Book of Genesis, on which I have the honour of addressing you, which is practically agreed upon by all writers, whatever their critical views may be. That point is the unity of the design with which the book is written. It is probably composed, or rather compiled, out of a number of documents, some of them of a very brief and almost fragmentary character; but these have been so brought together, so arranged and so connected, as to constitute a complete whole, with one character and one purpose. That purpose is to reveal God, in His relation to the world as a whole, and to the human race. The Book does not provide us with a mere disjointed set of memorials of the history of the world and of man in distant ages. It is not a mere collection of scraps of history, such as those which at this day are being slowly dug out of the earth in Mesopotamia, Egypt, and Crete. It does not throw these fragments of history before us, leaving us to piece them together and construct some sort of history out of them. It recounts, in a connected series, such portions of that past history as exhibit the action and intervention of God in creating, guiding, and controlling the whole. It starts from

[1] An address delivered on May 7th, 1903.

the beginning, in which God created the heavens and the earth, and goes down to the death of Joseph, or, roughly speaking, to a period not quite so far before our Lord's day as we are now after it. On the same rough calculation we may perhaps say that we are now at about the same distance after our Lord's day as Abraham was before it. The book surveys this immense period of time in one masterly grasp, passing by most of the details in the history of the world and of man which are not of importance for its object, but dealing fully with the great facts which concern God's action and purposes. One will and one purpose are revealed to us as guiding the whole course of the long history. We see unrolled before us in a great drama the work that God was working from the beginning to the end.

Let me remind you briefly of the main facts thus unrolled before us. We begin in the first chapter with an account of the creation by God, and the gradual development by Him of the universe in which we live; and we are told that everything in that universe was created by Him for a distinct purpose, and received a definite commission, and was appointed for a good end. All is created to be under the dominion of man, to be subdued by him and turned to a good purpose. Man's office is to increase and multiply, to replenish the earth, to subdue it, and to have dominion. That is man's function, but in order to fulfil it he is warned against one danger—he is forbidden certain pleasures which, he is told, will be fatal to him. He disregards the warning, disobeys the voice by which it had been given to him, and consequently, as he had been told would be the case, the task of subduing the earth becomes vastly

more difficult to him, and he becomes subject to death. Above all, he loses the full communion with his Divine Master and Guide which he was intended to enjoy, and in consequence he falls rapidly into the deepest moral crimes, into lust and murder, which render life intolerable. God, accordingly, interposes to sweep away from the face of the earth a race which had become hopelessly corrupt, and gives, as it were, a new start to the one branch of the stock which had escaped the general corruption. But even out of this stock a further selection is made, and a new method is adopted to bind this select race to the God without whom they were sure to fall again into corruption and decay. Out of the descendants of Noah the family of Terah and Abraham is chosen to receive special revelations, and to hand down from generation to generation those intimations of God's will which had from time to time been made to them. God is revealed as entering into a definite covenant with this family, claiming from them absolute obedience to his will and guidance, but in turn making certain definite promises, not only to the patriarchs themselves, but to their whole family to all time :—

"God appeared unto Abraham and said unto him, I am the Almighty God : walk before Me and be thou perfect. And I will make My covenant between Me and thee, and will multiply thee exceedingly. . . . And in thy seed shall all the nations of the earth be blessed because thou hast obeyed My voice."

This family of Abraham accordingly becomes the subject of special guidance and protection, and the remainder of the book narrates the education of the patriarch's descendants; until, in the person of

Joseph, we have a character exhibited who lived with a single heart in the love and fear of God, and who is employed under a mysterious Providence in preparing the way for the discipline of the whole people of Israel. As the book closes they are settled in Egypt, where they are to stay for some four hundred years, and where they enter upon that prolonged series of relations with all the civilisations of mankind, which has continued down to the present day. Such, in brief review, are the contents of the book.

Let us now observe that the development of human history and human knowledge has tended to justify, step by step, the account of God's action and of the course of history, thus revealed in the past and predicted in the future. Consider, in the first place, the opening chapter of the book. The greatest man of science of the present day, Lord Kelvin, declared, at the close of a lecture recently delivered in this college, that science had established the main principle which is asserted in the chapter. "Science," he said, "positively affirms creative power. It was not in dead matter that men lived and moved and had their being, but in the creating and directing power which science compelled them to accept as an act of belief. They only knew God in His works, but they were absolutely forced by science to admit and to believe with perfect confidence in a Directive Power, and in an influence other than physical, dynamical, electrical forces. They had a spiritual influence, and in science the knowledge was granted to them of that influence in the world around." Since the days, whatever they were, when the first chapter of the Book of Genesis was written, through what mazes of speculation has not the

human mind passed as to the origin of nature, and as to the mode in which the world has been developed and its present condition evolved, before the prince of science, as he was justly called by the chairman of that meeting, could declare without hesitation that this was the result of the scientific study of the universe? Yet thousands of years before this scientific result was obtained, the Hebrew writer recorded the truth that "in the beginning God created the heaven and the earth," and that He proceeded gradually, and by an orderly process and for a good purpose, to create the infinite constituent elements of that universe, and finally to make man as the lord and ruler of the whole.

It is unnecessary, for such a purpose as the present, to enter into the disputes which have prevailed as to the exact correspondence of the order of creation as recorded in the first chapter of Genesis with the discoveries of modern astronomical and geological science. The wonderful thing is that that account should be, at the very least, so near the truth, that there should be any possibility of dispute about the matter. Take all the other cosmogonies that have been found in other ancient records, including in particular those Babylonian records which are at present attracting so much attention, and which of them is there, respecting which the idea could be for a moment entertained, that there was any material correspondence between them and the records of modern science? Yet it was possible for a man of science, sufficiently distinguished to have been the President of the British Association, to state, less than ten years ago that "it would not be easy even now to construct a statement of the development of the world in popular terms so concise and so accurate" as

the first chapter of Genesis.[1] Remember, that when this chapter was written, nothing had been revealed by science respecting the course of the world's development. There was no natural source from which the knowledge could have been derived. From whence could have come this marvellous approximation, to say the least, to the facts which science has been slowly revealing, but from the Divine wisdom which alone was cognisant of them, and could alone make them known to mankind?

Even if there were any reason for believing that the original source of this chapter is to be found in Babylonian myths—the Babylonian myths which have been lately brought to light—there would still be no natural explanation of the means by which the Hebrew writer was able to purify these myths, conceived, as Professor Driver himself has said, in a spirit of "an exuberant and grotesque polytheism," and mould them to the expression of these great cardinal truths, and to the declaration, at least in general terms, of the great law of development. But as a matter of fact there is no good reason whatever for supposing that the narratives in this chapter were derived from those Babylonian sources. All that has been shown is that there are certain resemblances between the two, and the resemblance is as well accounted for by supposing the Hebrew narrative to be the earlier, and the Babylonian to be a perversion either of the narrative itself, or of the traditions which it embodies. Accordingly, one of the leading critics of Germany (Professor Kittel, of Leipzig), in a little treatise on the Babylonian excavations and early Biblical history which has just

[1] Sir William Dawson, in the *Expositor* for February, 1894.

been translated and published by the Society for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge, observes that "this much is certain: the Biblical conception of the universe which constitutes a part of our faith, and in so far as it does so, is for us not a Babylonian conception, but extremely ancient knowledge, partly the result of experience, and partly revealed by God to man and preserved among His people." The more this chapter of Genesis is considered in its relation to the monstrous myths and dreams respecting the creation of the world which have prevailed elsewhere, the more will it be seen to be one of the strongest evidences of the miraculous and Divine inspiration of the writers of the Bible.

But proceeding to look at the subsequent parts of the narrative, observe, in the first place, the description which is given of man's function in the world—to increase and multiply and replenish the earth, to subdue it and to have dominion. It was in those words that Lord Bacon discerned the best description of the office of man in relation to nature, embodying a reference to it in the very title of the great work which gave a new impulse to science, his "Novum Organum," or "Aphorismi de Interpretatione Naturæ, et *Regno Hominis*." It is because the English and kindred races are fulfilling that function at the present day more fully and earnestly than any other race, that they hold so leading a position in the world.

From this statement of man's worldly destiny, observe how the sacred writer or compiler passes at once with unerring instinct to the one point on which the fulfilment of that destiny depends—I mean to man's moral position. He describes man as placed in a world

full of all manner of trees, pleasant to the sight and good for food, the tree of life also in the midst of the garden. Men are bidden to use them all, subject to one condition—a moral obligation laid upon them by their Creator to abstain from certain enjoyments which are allegorically described as the knowledge of good and evil. So it is this day. Every child starts in the world amidst a paradise of things pleasant and good; but the first thing it has to learn is, that it is under a moral obligation to abstain from some of those pleasures; and if a man indulges in them his higher life, his real life, will be destroyed. He will find a curse attaching itself to all his work and all the results of his labours. The first great lesson, in short, that a man has to learn is, that his material happiness entirely depends on his recognition of his moral obligations, and his obedience to that voice of his conscience which is the voice of God. A great nation and a great city like this may have in it all things that are pleasant to the sight and good for food, mental and physical, but history bears witness in the loudest tones that they will all turn to dust in our mouth—"Vanity of vanities"—unless they are used under that sense of moral restraint which the Divine voice has impressed upon them. Is it not childish to be wasting time in disputing about some slight resemblances in this penetrating picture of human experience to a few Babylonian records, when the lesson and the moral is, that this ancient writer, speaking out of the dim and distant past, should pass from the only accurate description ever given of man's physical position in the world, to tell us in a vivid story, true to this day in the experiences of human nature—a story which may be allegorical, or which

may, as Coleridge said, be both history and allegory—that the whole of man's position, his very life, depends, not on the good and pleasant things around him, but on his moral obedience to the will and law of his Creator? How are we to explain such a marvellous revelation in the infancy of our race and history but by the explanation ascribed to the patriarch Job:—

"God understandeth the way thereof, and He knoweth the place thereof. For He looketh to the ends of the earth, and seeth under the whole heaven; to make the weight for the winds; and He weigheth the waters by measure. When He made a decree for the rain and a way for the lightning of the thunder, then did He see it and declare it; He prepared it, yea, and searched it out. And unto man He said, Behold, the fear of the Lord, that is wisdom; and to depart from evil is understanding."

As to the few chapters which immediately follow, dealing with the earliest history of mankind, I will only observe that they have recorded for the Jewish and Christian Churches that which neither Greece nor Rome nor any other literary historical sources have preserved to us, but which the excavations now proceeding on the banks of the Euphrates and the Tigris have partially revealed to our own generation—namely, that the origins of civilisation are to be found in the Mesopotamian valley and in the ancient cities of Babylonia and Assyria. Every Christian child, who has read those early chapters of the Bible, has known more about the early history of our race than until lately could be found in any other writer, ancient or modern. Nor will I dwell further upon the story of the flood, except to observe that the existence of

kindred narratives in the Babylonian sources is a strong independent corroboration of the fact that a great convulsion in the nature of the flood did actually occur. The narrative in the Bible is simple and natural, compared with the form which the traditions assume in the Babylonian and Assyrian legends. There is no evidence whatever that it was derived from those sources; and we may confidently believe that it will prove, like the narratives of the Creation and the Fall, to be a true record of the most ancient traditions on the subject, even if it be not, as has been suggested with some reason, a contemporary narrative of the event.

But for the purpose of a brief lecture we must pass from these interesting though, in some respects, obscure parts of our book, to the patriarchal narratives of which the general course has been described to you. And in respect to that, what can be more extraordinary than their truth to the broad facts of history? Is it not the most patent fact of history, that its whole course has been determined by the influence and the action of the Jewish race, culminating in the life and death of the Son of David? Is not the key to all history to be found in the opening verse of St. Matthew's Gospel: "The Book of the generation of Jesus Christ, the Son of David, the Son of Abraham"? Have not our Saviour's life and death and resurrection, and the Church which He founded, been the central influence of history? and does not the course of history at this moment depend more upon the action and the influence of the Christian nations than upon any other factor? Can we, as Christians, fail to recognise that we see before our eyes the realisation of the promise preserved in this ancient record: "In

thy seed shall all nations of the earth be blessed"? But if this be so, who told that ancient writer that profound historic verity? Who revealed to him beforehand the fact that this lonely patriarch was the beginning of an influence which would permeate the world, which would transform its laws and mould its civilisation; that forty centuries after that time Abraham would be the very type of religious faith; that the Psalms of his descendant David, and of the other sweet singers of Israel, would mould the religious life and thought of the leading races of mankind; and that his greatest descendant would be known by the name of the Saviour of the world?

There is one other thing about these patriarchal narratives which deserves our special attention. They not merely record the origin of the great historical influences which we have been considering; they also record the establishment once for all of the greatest of all the facts of religion—the establishment, namely, of a covenant between God and man. When men speak, as is very often done in the present day, about the monotheistic character of the Jewish religion, when they dwell upon that as the element of chief importance in the matter, they are leaving out of account the most momentous point of all. That point is not merely that there is but one God, but that that God has definitely and distinctly entered into moral relations with men; that in the persons, first of Noah, and then of Abraham and Abraham's seed, he has established between himself and man the most sacred of all relations—the relation of a covenant. It is by covenants, and the mutual faith which they involve, that civilisation is mainly characterised. It is by

covenants that marriages and families and armies and states are created; and God Himself entered as a living personal force into human life, when He chose out, first one man, and then one nation, and then one Church, to be bound in covenant with Him, to enter into mutual pledges, confirmed by definite signs—by circumcision and the Passover, by Baptism and the Lord's Supper; so that every Jew carries the mark in his flesh of his personal relation to God, and every Christian bears on his forehead, and receives in the symbols of bread and wine a perpetual witness, not merely of his belief in one God—not merely of his devotion to his Saviour—but of the personal relation in which that God stands towards him, and of his being as directly in covenant with his God and his Saviour as he is with his wife or with his earthly Sovereign; with the sole difference that the bond is infinitely more vital, more penetrating, more permanent, or rather, that it is eternal. There is nothing more precious in the Book of Genesis than that it reveals this system of covenants as the basis of God's dealings with mankind, and as the central influence by which He disciplines and guides them. The roots of the Gospel, as St. Paul clearly asserts, were thus laid in the history of Abraham; and the rest of the Bible, both the Old Testament and the New, is but a history of the manner in which that method has been applied, maintained, and continuously developed. God's character and God's ways began to be revealed in these patriarchal histories. They are an essential part of the whole Revelation, because they are its starting point and its germ; and we can no more dispense with these narratives, if we would understand God's will and

God's ways, than we can neglect the roots of a tree if we would understand its growth.

But the question is asked whether we have sufficient reason to believe that these narratives are what is now commonly called historical. Have we reason to believe that they narrate real matters of fact? In answer to this question, it must first of all be said that there are narratives—and that these are among them—which by their internal character bespeak their own veracity. It is difficult to understand how any one can really suppose that narratives so instinct with life and human nature, bearing traces in numberless details of the most vivid and touching experiences—take, for instance, that exquisitely touching exclamation: "There they buried Abraham and Sarah his wife; there they buried Isaac and Rebekah his wife; and there I buried Leah"—that narratives such as these should be due, as some would say, to the artificial idealising of a later age. But it is a more reasonable question to ask, How could they have been preserved in those ancient times? Less than thirty years ago it was very difficult to give a satisfactory answer to that question. Read the most learned commentator of that time—such an eminent writer, for instance, as Ewald—and you find him treating as a doubtful point how far writing was known in the Mosaic age. But within the last few days you have been brought face to face in the daily press with a wonderful discovery which has at last removed all difficulty upon that point. You know that a long inscription has been discovered, containing a code of laws enacted by a king who was contemporary with Abraham, the very Amraphel of whom we read in the fourteenth chapter of Genesis. If we have, as

no scholar doubts, a whole code of laws which was committed to writing in the time of Abraham, it is clear that writing must have been familiarly practised long before his day, for it is inconceivable that such a code of laws should be inscribed in such a permanent form, unless the use of writing was familiar and customary. This at once explains the striking fact that you have in the fourteenth chapter of Genesis the names correctly recorded of kings contemporary with Abraham—names which have been preserved upon monuments, to be a witness to these days of the possibility of authentic records being kept in his time. This being the case, it becomes not only possible, but probable, that important events—above all, momentous occurrences such as the revelation made by God to Abraham and the establishment of a covenant with him—would be recorded at the time. And when we further find that the records of that time were so carefully and so thoroughly made, that they have descended to us in perfectly legible form through a lapse of four thousand years, we have palpable proof that the means existed of preserving the historic and patriarchal records contained in the Book of Genesis. All that the compiler of the Book of Genesis had to do was to take the records which were ready to his hand, and to select and arrange. He had only to do, under Divine guidance and inspiration, exactly what St. Luke describes himself as doing at the outset of the Gospel—to take the records and narratives which were available, and, under the "inspiration of selection," to throw them into the form of that continuous history which has come to us under the title of "The Book of Genesis."

Let me observe then, in conclusion, that it is quite a secondary matter when some critics tell us that this book is composed out of various documents, and when they propose by methods of linguistic analysis to dissect these documents, and to describe them separately. So does the anatomist, when he has before him the human eye, dissect it out into its muscles and nerves and veins, and lay its innumerable parts separately before us. But, as Coleridge observed, when you have all these parts in detail before you, is that the human eye? Does that dissection explain to you the mystery of the marvellous vital process, by which all those lifeless elements are combined into that wonderful organism which our Saviour describes as the light of the body? Just so with all these dissections and analyses of this marvellous book. Look upon it in the light of the truths we have been considering, and does it not fascinate you like an inspired eye, a Divine eye, penetrating into the secrets of the creation of nature, of the moral constitution of man, of the primary forces of history? Do not these revelations beset you behind and before, and lay their mysterious hand upon you, revealing to you at once yourselves and nature and history and religion? Do you not seem to hear the Divine demand to the patriarchs, "Where wast thou when I laid the foundations of the earth? Declare if thou hast understanding"? The same hand and spirit that laid those foundations must have recorded the history of them in this book; and there is, perhaps, no book in the Scripture of which it is more evident that the prophetic narrative came not in old time by the will of man, but that holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost.

SPEECH BY SIR ROBERT ANDERSON, K.C.B., LL.D.

Ladies and Gentlemen,—It was my privilege to be here last Friday, and I came here to-day under the belief that my part in the chair would be as formal as was that of the distinguished President of this College, Lord Reay. But I find I am expected to say something upon the subject of the lecture. First, however, as I am not aware that there is any provision made for a formal vote of thanks to the Dean of Canterbury, I may associate myself with you in expressing our great obligation to him for coming here this afternoon and delivering to us the lecture to which we have just listened. These obligations are all the deeper, and I am sure we feel them all the more keenly, because of the exceptional circumstances in which, after having been compelled to avoid other engagements made before his recent promotion, he has fulfilled his promise to come here to-day.

Now, if I am to speak upon this subject, please remember that it will be only a few desultory words. I am sure I am speaking with the full sympathy of the Dean of Canterbury, when I say that his lecture was a remarkable proof that in this controversy, if I may so describe it, we are not defending traditional beliefs based upon the Bible, but we are defending the Bible itself. I congratulate this Union upon having evoked from that prince of scientists, as Lord Reay described Lord Kelvin, these words: "Science positively affirms creative power." It is, as it were, a last word upon a great controversy that has been raging for half a century. We cannot expect a last word upon this other controversy that is now before us, but we can expect some advance to be made upon it. I repeat that it is not a question of defending traditional beliefs about the Book of Genesis, but defending the Book of Genesis against attacks that have been

made upon it. In my early life I was taught to believe that Moses wrote the Book of Genesis in the sense in which Shakespeare wrote his plays. The critics discovered that there were documents in the Book of Genesis, and it was supposed that this raised the question whether the Book had Divine authority. But believing, as I do—and Professor Fairbairn, of Oxford, has stated it with great definiteness—that belief in a personal God involves belief in a written revelation, it is incredible that thousands of years should have passed before the days of Abraham without God having given a revelation to His people. If criticism has led us to discover that the Book of Genesis is a divinely accredited record of earlier revelations, this, instead of impairing its authority, seems to me only to confirm that authority.

May I say one passing word about the cosmogony? Most of us remember the great encounter between Mr. Gladstone and Professor Huxley in the pages of the *Nineteenth Century* upon that subject. Now this is a matter that I have gone into very closely, and the only point upon which Professor Huxley seemed plainly to show that there was a conflict between the clear results of scientific research and the first chapter of Genesis was shown afterwards to be a mere blunder. In the pages of the *Nineteenth Century* he expressed his admiration for Professor Dana and his willingness to sit at his feet upon this subject, and Professor Dana wrote to the *Nineteenth Century* that he agreed with Mr. Gladstone, and not with Professor Huxley.

Well now, upon this question of Genesis, we have to deal first with the Hebrew, and then with the archæology. In both these respects I am as much a learner and an outsider as anyone else in this theatre. We turn to the Hebraists, and all agree that the Book of Genesis does not afford materials which justify a decision that it is a late book. Upon this next question of archæology, will anyone in this theatre to-day tell us

of one single discovery in archæology that is against the Book of Genesis? The Dean of Canterbury has referred to Amraphel, mentioned in the fourteenth chapter of Genesis. Not long ago, in studying that chapter, I took down Smith's Bible Dictionary in order to find what I might learn about Amraphel. The article was by Dr. Pinches, and it was to the effect that we know absolutely nothing about Amraphel, but it might be hoped that future research would bring something to light. Dr. Pinches has recently published a book upon these subjects, and the frontispiece to that book is a portrait of Amraphel!

I pass to the question of the evidence upon which we are asked to reject the Book of Genesis. I do not think that I can be fairly charged with presumption if I venture to say that I have some fitness to deal with a question of that kind, for I am not quite a novice in dealing with intricate questions of evidence, or in seeking to discover frauds; and when I consider the grounds upon which we are asked to reject the genuineness of the Pentateuch, I am filled with blank amazement. The Dean of Canterbury has referred to Amraphel's code of laws; he has told you how but yesterday the Pentateuch was set aside because it was deemed an anachronism to suppose that there could be such literature in the days of Moses. Now the critics discover that there was a literature belonging to the age of Abraham. But what use do they make of it? In this Babylonian code there are laws akin to those embodied in the Mosaic code—two especially, laws relating to an unfaithful wife, and to the ox that gores. But no one need be surprised to find that laws, which are common to the code of every civilised nation, should be found in both the Babylonian and the Mosaic codes. Anyone who knows anything about evidence would look to see whether the *penalties* are the same; and in not one single case has this been shown.

Before I sit down I should like to say a word of

another kind. I cannot consent to give up my place as a Christian, and a Christian does not hold the Old Testament by permission of the critics; he has received it from the hand of his Divine Master and Lord. The only answer to this is the theology of the *Kenosis*, a word borrowed from the second chapter of Philippians, by which the higher critics mean that our Divine Lord so emptied Himself, with a view to His mediatorial work, that He took His place as a Jew among Jews, and slowly felt His way to the light in the apprehension of truth. But the Lord had communications with His disciples during those mysterious forty days before the Ascension. I turn to the twenty-fourth chapter of the Gospel of St. Luke, and find that, in the most definite and emphatic manner, He adopts all His teaching of the period of His humiliation, and accredits all that is said to them on that subject; and there He says to His apostles: "These are the words which I spake unto you, while I was yet with you, that all things must be fulfilled which were written in the law of Moses, and in the prophets, and in the psalms, concerning Me." That means the Hebrew Scriptures; these were the Scriptures which testified of Him. And now, standing after the Resurrection, with full Divine knowledge of all these things, He sends out His apostles to proclaim this to Church and world, and for nineteen centuries our Divine Lord has permitted Church and world to be deluded with these "superstitions" and "falsities"! It seems to me that this is an awfully solemn position to take up.

THE SYNOPTIC GOSPELS AS INDEPENDENT WITNESSES

By the Rev. Professor D. S. Margoliouth, D.Litt.[1]

The negative criticism of the Synoptic Gospels is best represented in English by two popular works, both of which for some reason appeared anonymously. One of these, called *The Four Gospels as Historical Records*, attracted no great amount of attention, partly because the author's tone left something to be desired, and partly because he committed the serious mistake of directing his attacks mainly on antiquated works. His attitude was not distinctly anti-Christian, but in accordance with the principle held by many, that the miraculous narratives are not a support on which Christianity rests, but a weight which drags it down. He therefore endeavoured to show, from a careful collection and collation of the discrepancies in the Gospels, that none of these narratives rest upon trustworthy evidence; and he assumed as his principle of criticism that, where two narratives of the same event differ, one must be false, and the other not necessarily true. That doctrine of course appears to be sound; but it would be possible, by applying it rigorously, to dispose of most ancient history, and also of much modern history.

[1] An address delivered on Thursday, May 14th, 1903.

To the other work, which is called *Supernatural Religion*, much more importance has been attached, and it is indeed possible that it has secured a permanent place in our national literature. In what it says of the Gospels, this work endeavours to deprive them of the character of contemporary witnesses, by showing that their authority was not recognised till late in the second century, and that when writers earlier than that date quote the Gospel or mention either the sayings or doings of the Founder of Christianity, they preferably employ other sources. And the permanent value of *Supernatural Religion* is probably to be found in the care and accuracy with which these quotations are tabulated, and the learning that is brought to bear on them. Having thus deprived the Gospels of their authoritative character, the author infers that they cannot be employed as evidence for the occurrence of supernatural operations.

To one who reads this work it will be easily apparent that what we may call the subjective element cannot be banished from discussions of this kind: in many cases the unprejudiced reader will certainly agree with the author against his opponents; in others, where the writer is no less positive, it will be found difficult to follow him. And the fact that he has a definite case to prove, probably deprives the book of some of the value which it might have for the settlement of that difficult problem, the date of the reduction of the Gospels to their present form. And the fact that unprejudiced persons will estimate the same evidence quite differently from each other, shows that we cannot, even in historical criticism, keep quite outside the region of psychology.

The same fact, the subjective character of certain parts of knowledge, strikes us still more forcibly when the question is raised, What amount of evidence, contemporary and independent, would suffice to prove the occurrence of a supernatural or supernormal event? Perhaps this question has nowhere been treated so well as by Mr. Frank Podmore in his recent history of Spiritualism, in which the fact is rightly emphasised that the trained observer is exceedingly rarely to be found, and that the evidence of the untrained observer is open to objection. In the *Nineteenth Century* for this month an astronomer gives an elaborate history of the canals in Mars, of their first discovery and of the series of persons who confirmed that discovery by independent observation, all of these persons trained and experienced in that particular style of observation. And his conclusion is that, in spite of the number and character of the observers, probably the canals are not in Mars at all, but entirely in the eyes of the astronomers. The limits between objective and subjective truth would appear to be a problem which may receive some light in the future, but which in the present state of knowledge constitutes a serious difficulty in the way of the handling of supernormal occurrences. For of those which are recorded in the Gospels, many can easily be paralleled from modern experiences which are excellently attested, but which will probably have little effect on the minds of those who assume an unalterable attitude towards what they see and hear. Thus, in order to show that the warning of Joseph by God in a dream was not a supernormal occurrence, we might quote the newspapers of April 18th of this year, where a man who found a dead body said it was owing

to a dream the night before, that he visited the spot where he found the corpse, and this statement attracted the attention of the coroner. Yet probably the attitude of those who regard the dream of Joseph as a relic of an exploded superstition will not be altered by the evidence of the daily papers of April 18th. We are, however, spared the trouble of searching the daily papers for supernormal occurrences similar to those recorded in the Gospels, for in a very recent work which has justly attracted much attention, we have as many as can be required. I refer to the posthumous work of F. W. H. Myers on the *Survival of Human Personality*, in which occurrences supernormal in character, and often exceedingly analogous to the contents of the Gospel records, are collected on a great scale, and in most cases the attestation seems to be as good as that which could be got for any historical fact. Affidavits were demanded, and in many cases obtained, from all the persons who were either present or had any share in the occurrence, and these affidavits are often dated and full names and addresses given. But if we consult the reviews which capable persons have written, it does not appear that the weight of evidence adduced by Myers has altered the opinions of those who had previously made up their minds about the survival of human personality. Those who had previously attached importance to statements about the reappearance of the dead and their continued interest in human affairs, will find their opinion confirmed ; but to those who attached no importance to them, and to whom the survival of human personality in the manner contemplated by Myers seemed incredible, the attestations and dates and addresses will be of little moment.

And indeed, in collating the work of Myers with that of his friend and colleague, F. Podmore, to which reference has been made, the reader is confirmed in his opinion of the subjectivity of knowledge in all such questions; for frequently what seemed to be of vast importance to the one, seemed insignificant to the other.

Hence I doubt whether the question, What amount of contemporary and independent evidence would be sufficient to establish a miracle? can in the present state of knowledge be answered, and it is not my present intention to polemise against either of the writers whom I mentioned before. It has, however, come in my way to study literature which, externally at least, bears some resemblance to the Synoptic Gospels, and to read what has been made out about its genesis, and the canons by which its credibility can be ascertained. From this, light, perhaps of a rather dim kind, is thrown here and there on the problems with which the two authors are occupied. And the fairness will scarcely be questioned of applying to matter which is naturally approached with some prejudice the canons that are derived from matter which is approached with no prejudice whatever.

The text on which I propose to speak consists of the words, "The Gospel according to." And of these, "The Gospel" will not delay us long. The word which it represents is a Greek compound invented for the purpose of rendering some Semitic equivalent for the expression "Good news." And there are places in the New Testament where the sense is obscured by the substitution of the word "Gospel" for "Good news." When by the side of such miracles as the restoration of sight

to the blind and walking to the lame, we read that to the poor the Gospel is preached, we should gain something in clearness by the rendering "to the miserable good news are proclaimed." Yet at an early period the phrase *Evangelion* clearly acquires a technical sense as descriptive of the elements of Christianity. Those elements consisted partly in a body of rules for life and doctrine; but it is impossible to separate law entirely from history, and even the most elementary Gospel was a combination of precept and narrative. The definition of the Gospel given by the writer called St. Luke, as the things which Jesus said and did, is therefore accurate.

But the phrase "according to" takes us into a region which is not easy to explore—the region of oral tradition and of books based upon it. A book can be by one or at most a limited number of authors; but it may be according to an unlimited number of authorities. The literatures in which oral tradition can best be studied are those of the Jews and the Moslems; indeed, the whole notion of oral tradition was with the latter people the subject of such minute study, of such acute analysis, and of such elaborate technicalities, that we can have no better guides than their manuals of oral tradition, when we would form to ourselves some idea of the course which it took with other nations. For though the study of tradition with no other race appears to have developed into a science, human nature is so similar all the world over that many of the phenomena attending the process of the evolution of religious books from oral tradition will quite certainly have repeated themselves.

The Gospels then, as we learn from the word

"according to," existed as oral tradition before they were compiled in writing. And indeed, the signs of oral tradition, too, are everywhere the same. In works which embody traditions belonging to the same cycle, much of the matter is likely to be identical; but while characteristic and striking phrases are preserved, there is regularly considerable variation, both in the form and substance of what is told. There is usually also great variety in the arrangement. Since a narrative can be drawn up by one person only in a particular form of words, identity of phrase is proof of identity of source.

That the phenomena presented by the Synoptic Gospels agree with this description, is apparent to any one who considers their contents when put in parallel columns. It is moreover attested by the circumstance that early quotations of matter contained in them are usually made from either the Gospel in the singular, implying that separate recensions of the Gospel were not yet extant, or at any rate not yet distinguished, or from Gospels which have perished, though their names have remained; and in some cases fragments of such documents have come to light. The case which is in every way parallel is that of the life of the Founder of Islam. The earliest life of him which we possess is not earlier than the year 140 of his era, and we are by no means sure that it was committed to writing at so early a date. But that biography, when collated with other works on the same subject, exhibits differences and identities which are closely parallel to those which the Synoptic Gospels display. Whole pages are word for word the same, or differ merely in occasional expressions or occasional details of the narrative; but the order in

which the events are arranged is not always the same, and indeed, at times, widely different. There is some variation in even what appear to be official lists, compiled for some grave reason and at the instance of the supreme authority in the state. The same narratives in almost identical words are to be found in works that are considerably later than the first biography; and then they are not always quoted from the first biography, but from some parallel and independent source. The reason for this is that although written literature in the long run ousts oral literature, the latter has a tendency to survive, owing to the reasons which at the first led men to prefer to hand down narratives orally rather than commit them to writing.

The author of the Third Gospel attests this in that short preface which is so rich in contents. The person to whom he dedicated his book had been taught the Gospel orally before the author gave him in writing the means of knowing the accurate truth about what he had heard. Let us try to enumerate the reasons which have led men to preserve matter orally or mentally instead of committing it to writing. We can easily think of several such motives.

The first is the existence of a sacred literature in writing which will tolerate no rivals. To any one who considers the style in which the Books or the Writing or Writings are quoted in the New Testament, it will seem doubtful whether any other writings besides the Bible can have been in existence at the time; at least, the Jewish movement which culminated in a rule forbidding the writing of anything besides the Bible was started long before New Testament times. What was tolerated besides the Scripture was a collection of oral

tradition, of which the amount was never precisely fixed. Had the Gospel at the first been written, the charge of endeavouring to oust the Old Testament, which in any case was levelled against the early Christians, would have had an obvious ground. For it certainly is the tendency of new sacred books to oust the old ones.

But secondly, literature is kept unwritten when the possession of it is fraught with danger. It can be ascertained what books a man has in his library, but not what books are lodged in the recesses of his mind. So long, then, as a sect is liable to persecution and has to maintain itself in secrecy, it is a measure of precaution to write no official treatises. And indeed, to many persons in all ages the possession of heretical books has been synonymous with holding heretical opinions.

But there is a third reason, less honourable than those which have been suggested, and that is the desire to give knowledge factitious value by rendering it difficult of access. So long as knowledge is lodged within the breast, it can be procured only by communication with its possessors. Those, therefore, retain an authority which they lose when the information becomes easily accessible. Hence there is ordinarily a class of persons, who have a special interest in retaining knowledge in the memory and forbidding its being committed to writing.

Other reasons that prevail in poor and humble communities are the dearness of writing material, and therefore the cheapness of oral, as opposed to written, circulation; the want of the literary training necessary for the composition of a continuous narrative, whereas

little if any is required for the mere putting together of an oral anecdote or repetition of a striking saying —especially where the introduction of a religion does not, as sometimes, raise a vernacular for the first time into a literary language; for the want of training which will not prevent many a man from speaking, will prove a serious obstacle when he would compose in writing.

Which of these reasons was most effective with the early Christians cannot perhaps be determined; but the fact that the literature of the New Testament begins with letters, is rather in favour of the notion taken over from the Jews having been the most potent. For we find, and indeed naturally, that the objection to the composition of books among them did not apply to that of letters, which they expressly permitted. Hence the expression "like a letter" is occasionally found signifying a form of literature of which the permissibility was not open to question. Letters might indeed naturally contain traditions, if it so happened that a question had been addressed from a distance concerning one; and thus there is, of course, a well-known case in which one of St. Paul's epistles coincides with the matter contained in the Gospels; but this would not appear to violate the notion of the impropriety of committing traditions to books, since the letter would naturally be supposed to have an ephemeral existence.

And yet one other reason, which was often of great weight, was a belief in the living voice as opposed to the dead letter. Plato was one of the first who taught men to rate the written book, which always says the same, and can solve no difficulties, far below the voice of the living teacher, who possesses a stock of knowledge

beyond that which he can communicate in a single lesson, and who can vary the character of his teaching so as to suit the needs of each learner. And, indeed, in one of the classical passages about the origin of the Gospels, the evidence of Papias, the author quoted declares himself of this opinion with regard to the teaching of Christianity. It was the living voice whence he professed to derive the material that he valued, and not the dead treatise. In process of time, when everything which the living voice could have to communicate is committed to some writing material, the belief in the living voice is something of a superstition or of a sentiment; it is, however, one which even in these days is not quite extinct. In the second century of the Christian era it would have had many a rational ground.

Experience shows that these motives may continue to work either separately or together for a very considerable length of time. The only cases in which that length of time can be satisfactorily tested are those in which there are parallel streams of oral and of written tradition; and from the few cases of this we can infer the possibility of the retention of matter with tolerable accuracy for at least some centuries.

When, however, some one has broken through the rule against writing and put into book form that which had till that time been preserved orally, many others are emboldened to do the same. These works are not necessarily dictated by any feeling of rivalry to the first work in the field, but by consciousness of the value of collateral series of traditions. Each man who has had access to a collection of oral traditions which he finds to vary considerably from that which

has begun to circulate in writing, is desirous of seeing the form in which he himself heard them preserved. And since it is the tendency of written literature to oust oral literature from the field, the written collections are apt to be nearly contemporary, the possessors of the less known traditions being anxious to obtain for them the same sort of popularity that has accrued to those which, being embodied in popular books, are accessible to every one and become canonical.

The valuable Preface to the Third Gospel takes us to the time in which the writing down of the oral collections had begun, and affords us the important piece of information that the number of Gospels then published was already considerable. It is only to be regretted that this author did not conceive it desirable to name his predecessors, since such information would have been of the highest value to posterity. The ordinary history of literature renders it probable that in such cases the fittest are certain to survive. The fittest will be the collections of which the matter is acknowledged by the best informed persons to be accurate and important. Serious mis-statements will weaken the authority of a work which has many rivals, and lead to its being neglected and eventually perishing.

The phrases employed in the Preface to the Third Gospel speak of the originators of the tradition as belonging to a past age, without stating precisely what difference of time separated them from the author. That point can, of course, be settled only by external evidence, which it is not proposed to discuss at this time. Where, however, a series of narratives are orally perpetuated in a fixed form of words, committed to memory and handed from generation to generation,

a nucleus of history is sure to be preserved. It is not preserved so well as pen and ink or their equivalent can preserve it; but it is the best known substitute.

We may now consider the functions discharged by the authors of the written collections; they are three. They have to transfer the matter from their memory to the parchment or papyrus. They have to set in some sort of permanent order traditions which, so long as they existed in the memory only, had no chronological succession. And they can also criticise the material which they employ, selecting out of a variety of accounts those which are best attested. To all three functions there is allusion in the Preface to the Third Gospel.

The difference in the contents of the collections will arise in the first place from local conditions. At different centres of Christianity different traditions will assuredly have been preserved, and each Evangelist will have been limited to some extent by this circumstance. Experience shows that the communities resident in particular places may retain for centuries the memory of traditions which are not known elsewhere. Hence both in the Jewish and the Moslem books we read of persons travelling from one country to another for the purpose of hearing traditions; this practice in the case of the Moslems went on for many centuries, implying that not everything known about their Prophet was registered; it is possible that this travelling in search of tradition among them is not obsolete even at this date. Only one who visited and studied with every community of his co-religionists could, during the time when the tradition lived, be certain of getting access to all that was to be known.

Hence we have merely to suppose the Gospels to have been composed at different places to understand why their contents differ.

The criticism of the material of which the Third Gospel speaks, with the Moslems invariably means one thing. The traditionalist should know exactly through whom the tradition comes; if he can also state the date and place at which each one of them heard it, so much the better. Hence we get a difference between books of tradition, according to the strictness or laxity of the conditions on which narratives are admitted. But even where the conditions are equally strict, accident may often determine whether a tradition will or will not be admitted. For the same tradition may be known to one collector by a trustworthy, to another by an untrustworthy source; the second collector will in consequence omit from his collection a narrative which is perfectly authentic, and which is known to him, but which, owing to the weakness of a link in the chain of authorities by which he knows it, fails to satisfy the conditions of admittance.

Of the existing Gospels, the third one employs a form of tradition which often plays an important part in the beginnings of history. I allude to commemorative verses. Three times in the early portion of the narrative, characters are represented as commemorating events of importance in their lives by the composition of poems. If these poems were in any sort of Greek verse, we could have no hesitation in assigning them to the compiler of the Gospel, in which case we should compare them to the speeches put by most ancient historians in the mouths of the persons whose history they narrate: speeches which, though sometimes based

on actual reports, are more ordinarily fictitious. In the case of the poems in the Third Gospel the evidence is strongly in favour of their having been originally in Hebrew verse, whence the question of their authenticity becomes far more complicated. The closest parallel to them in literature is to be found in the commemorative verses, which the earliest biographers of Mohammed introduce very freely into their narratives. These are often commemorative of events which were regularly thus celebrated—of battles and defeats, or in general of deeds which were in some way extraordinary. Some others, however, commemorate emotions occasioned by particular and unusual situations. Some of these commemorative verses are of unquestioned genuineness, while others are open to suspicion.

The importance of the commemorative verses in the Third Gospel seems to lie in the fact of their going back directly to the Hebrew tradition, and therefore belonging clearly to an earlier stage than the Greek tradition which the Synoptic Gospels in the main embody. In two of the three cases, these commemorative verses have clearly preserved the names of persons whose existence would otherwise have been forgotten. Of course, from being ancient to being authentic is a long distance. But still these commemorative verses give us an interesting glimpse of the conditions of an early stage of Christianity.

The other documents used by the compilers of the Gospels were doubtless in prose. What we find to have happened in the case of Mohammed is that, shortly after his death, certain persons made it their special business to collect information about him, and to these the curious naturally had recourse. They, as it were,

focussed the available information, and gave it the form in which it afterwards was ordinarily communicated. Persons were still living who had been present at the most important occasions of their Prophet's career; who were ready, when asked, to tax their memories as to the order and nature of the occurrences which they had witnessed. Although then no written record was made of their narrations, at the most an occasional note being taken, the collectors of whom we are thinking did posterity a good service in bringing together under the head of the *Life of Mohammed* narratives which might easily have been lost. They, of course, had no monopoly of the information, which could be as readily communicated to others so long as its authors were alive; but living in the most accessible places, they were more easily to be approached by questioners.

That St. Matthew occupied a place of this sort in the history of the biography of Christ seems to be attested by the tradition, and is not inherently improbable. Supposing him to have written nothing, nevertheless a story repeatedly told soon becomes stereotyped, and while its hearers endeavour to make as few variations as possible when they repeat it, even the author is unlikely to take any great license in the matter of revision.

The greater number of traditions, however, are not likely to have been lengthy, but composed of single sentences or short paragraphs. Such are, in the first place, most easily remembered by those who heard them, and are also the easiest to teach; for when we remember that the oral instructor had at times to repeat the same matter a hundred times before the

disciple had committed it to memory, the shortness of a tradition would be a help towards its perpetuation.

Of these short traditions we should fancy there must have been a very great store in early times. If at the time of the Resurrection the number of Christians already reached five hundred, as we are told by St. Paul, each one of these would assuredly have remembered something or other which he had heard from the Master, or which he had been told by some actual eye-witness. Slight differences in the form of a particular saying are doubtless often to be attributed to the different degree of accuracy with which these hearers remembered what they had heard.

Of the ways in which these sayings came to be perpetuated, the Mohammedan parallel affords some suggestions. A number of sayings must surely have been preserved, because they threw light on questions of conduct. Where the theory prevails that for rules of conduct men should go, not to reason, but to authority, pronouncements on such subjects by an authoritative speaker are eagerly treasured up, to be utilised when occasion arises. The greater number of traditions, however, were not of this sort, but were homiletic or aphoristic in character. In Moslem communities a saying was often treasured up in a particular family, as a special honour that had been bestowed on the member of the family to whom it had been uttered; and it is probable that the origin of some of the sayings recorded in the Gospels is similar.

But the framework into which the Evangelists worked whatever material they could collect, was doubtless that sketch of events which had to be communicated to every proselyte, and which began with the Baptism

of John and ended with the Resurrection and Ascension.

The variations in the accounts are probably in the main due to the forms in which the isolated traditions were preserved by different reporters. Every one is aware that even trained reporters of speeches introduce a certain amount of variety into their reports; and in the accounts of sayings of Mohammed which are recorded on the authority of different witnesses, there is usually some variety, at any rate in the expression. Where the same scene is being described by different witnesses, naturally the variety is exceedingly great. The differences between the accounts of the same event which the Synoptic Gospels contain, would seem ordinarily to be of this sort, the sort which everyday experience can illustrate. And it is probable that in some cases at least these differences are evidence of the same event having been witnessed by several persons, or the same saying having been heard and reproduced with varieties occasioned by the understanding of different hearers.

In the case of the Gospels an element of variety enters, which is illustrated neither by the Jewish nor by the Mohammedan tradition: that is, the variety caused by differences of translation. While those to whom the traditions ultimately go back are likely in some cases to have communicated them in Greek, it is probable that in a greater number of cases the translation was done by secondary authorities. And, indeed, in every case in which sayings as opposed to actions were reported, the translation must have been performed by some intermediate authority. Highly interesting attempts have been made by various scholars to trace the original that underlies various reports of the same

saying; and in a few cases, this process leads to results that are both satisfactory and convincing. Those by which fragments of the Lord's Prayer have been reconstructed are of considerable interest. Owing, however, to the number of mouths through which the matter of the Gospels passed before reaching the shape in which we know it, this process can only be attempted in a few cases with success. It can be executed with the greatest certainty where it is a case of a passage of the Old Testament being quoted, in which different reporters have resorted to different sources for interpretation; and thus, behind the Evangelists, we get at the intermediate authorities, and from them obtain the verse in the form in which it was actually quoted by the speaker.

The Evangelists did not think fit to communicate to posterity the names of the persons through whom their matter had reached them, and thereby historical students have been deprived of a critical instrument, which is always at their disposal in the case of the Moslem traditions, and sometimes in the case of the Jewish. On the other hand, it should be noticed that the causes which most frequently led to the fabrication of traditions in the case of the Moslems, were ordinarily absent in that of the Christians.

The first and main cause of such fabrication was the need for legal precedents. No other source of law being known save their sacred book and the example set by their Prophet, when cases occurred for which provision had not been made, it was a common practice to invent a narrative which should provide the requisite precedent. The early Christians were saved from the necessity for this, and, indeed, there is exceedingly little

in the Gospels which could even be supposed to have had such an origin. They were saved from the necessity, because in the first place their society had for some centuries little political importance, and indeed, does not appear to have aimed at political independence. The sphere, therefore, in which the possibility of applying precedents was to be found, was exceedingly limited, and it was remembered that the Founder of Christianity had distinctly repudiated the office of judge or arbiter between disputants. And secondly, even where cases were not settled by the law of the state, Christianity did not at first undertake to provide a wholly new system, but rather glosses upon an old one. The emancipation of Christianity from Judaism is agreed to have been a process that took time, and the new sect started with a guide of acknowledged authority in the Old Testament. Having already a broad basis of law, they were under no compulsion to invent precedents for emergencies.

The second cause for the fabrication of traditions was also wanting. That cause lay in the needs of preachers. For it must be remembered that no one sect or nation has a monopoly of persons who feel called upon to endeavour to better their fellow-creatures, by diverting them at times from their ordinary pursuits to the thought of things eternal. Such preachers need a stock of authoritative maxims and promises, whereby the responsibility for their statements is thrown upon authority such as their hearers will recognise, which therefore they will claim the right to repeat and emphasise, without professing to have discovered them themselves. In the case of Islam, traditions which contain matter of this sort are in numerous cases

suspected of spuriousness, owing to their general disagreement with the spirit and character of its founder, and to the fact that the chain by which they are quoted ordinarily contains some weak links. In the case of the Gospels, the genuineness of texts of this sort is rarely suspected even by those who would deprive the narrative statements of most of their historical value. Indeed, in one of the works cited before, *The Four Gospels as Historical Records*, the author seems to be thoroughly satisfied that the true character of the Founder of Christianity and of His teaching is given in the contents of such chapters as the Sermon on the Mount, whatever may be the historical value of the setting. Supposing, then, that the genuine teaching of Christianity lay in inculcating the higher morality, these writers would rather make the loftiness of the saying evidence of their genuineness. The need, therefore, of the preacher being supplied from the original character of the doctrine—this second source of the fabrication of traditions would also be wanting.

If, therefore, we assume that the Synoptic Gospels were ordered collections made at some time in the second century of the matter current in the Christian communities, what should we infer from the analogies that have been adduced as to the independent character of their evidence? We should in the first place admit that the question is a highly complicated one, because the rays, if the expression may be used, are likely to have been repeatedly focussed. The number of original authorities was certainly great; but by the time of the writing of the Gospels it was enormously increased by those to whom the traditions were handed down, and who are likely to have received the same tradition from

various sources, as well as handed it down to various persons. Some force must be allowed to the negative evidence of those who permitted statements to remain uncontradicted, when it would have been in their power to contradict them : witnesses who, having been present at a scene afterwards distorted, would have been in a position to circulate a true report instead ; or who, from general knowledge of the sort of scenes described, would have been able to put the right gloss upon narratives of them which had a tendency to produce false impressions.

But the most important point appears to me to be the fact that a traditionalist in compiling a narrative has before him a set of conditions which a narrative must satisfy before he will admit it. That fact seems to me to give the answer to the difficulty so constantly urged in the work of Strauss and those which are based upon his—Why were the miracles recorded in the Fourth Gospel neglected by the Synoptic Gospels ? The answer suggested by the analogy which has been considered is that to those who compiled the Gospels the matter contained in St. John's Gospel may not have been known by a continuous chain of credible witnesses, such as they required before entering a record in their compositions. It seems to us, indeed, who get our knowledge from books, a strange thing to be unable to quote, let us say, Macaulay, without being able to name the series of persons who come between us and Macaulay—without being able to guarantee the trustworthiness of each link in that chain. But that is the principle which oral tradition suggests, and which in the passage of Papias to which reference has been made is expressly attested as having been current in early Christian communities.

That narrative of which I know the authorities I may tell; that which has not come down to me personally by a trustworthy chain I may not tell, however certain it may be. The absence, then, of a narrative from a particular Gospel implies nothing more than that the chain by which it came to the compiler was not technically perfect. This principle is ridiculed in a story of a Moslem traditionalist to whom wine was offered, and who was then reproached for drinking it by the offerer. "How," asked the traditionalist, "do you know that it is wine?" "I was told so by the Jew of whom I bought it." "How did he know?" "He was told so by the Christian from whose winepress it came." "I," said the traditionalist, "do not admit the evidence of Jews or Christians; so I will continue to drink what you call wine on their testimony." Where history was preserved orally, the rigid adherence to the principle of testifying only to what one personally knew was probably the best guarantee against the falsification of the record.

The steps which led to the survival of the present Synoptics out of a number of contemporary compositions of similar scope, have not hitherto been traced satisfactorily, and for the ultimate solution of that question further discoveries must be awaited: probably the soil of Egypt, which has preserved so much that was deemed irretrievably lost, will deliver up material for the prosecution of that enquiry also. Till then, the analogies which we have been considering would justify us in supposing that the factor which led to their survival was a widespread belief in the soundness of the chains by which the traditions had reached those who ultimately put them together in the form which we know. The

task of tracing each tradition to its source, which the author of the Third Gospel declared that he performed, was probably executed in all three cases; and the belief in the thoroughness with which it was executed was probably the determining factor in the survival of these particular Gospels out of many.

With regard to the value of their testimony, we cannot, I think, do better than constantly remember that the same has been weighed and examined repeatedly by the best-balanced and least-prejudiced minds, and that the results of these examinations have been exceedingly varied; from the firmest and most unswerving confidence in the absolute accuracy of every statement which they contain, coupled with the belief that all apparent differences admit of being harmonised or explained, to the intermediate position which assumes the general accuracy of the statements without excluding the possibility that errors of a variety of sorts have crept in; and thence to the negative position that resolves the whole into myth or even conscious fabrication. At one time these differences were settled by religious disabilities, and far severer measures; a wiser age, having abandoned these methods and their like, still leaves no stone unturned with the hope of obtaining material that may lead to their ultimate solution; and while this hope receives occasionally some justification, it is probable that still more is to be hoped from the scientific analysis of the mental process and of the data of consciousness. The reason why, in the search after truth, different enquirers have reached such contradictory results will be clearer when rather more is known of what Mr. Myers has called the psychic spectrum, and the consequent chances of different sorts of truth

being perceptible by different minds. Many of the differences which are to be found both in the original testimony and in its subsequent valuation, will thus reduce themselves to difference in the subject rather than in the object. The very question on which older generations of sceptics spoke so positively, whereas modern critics speak so modestly, the possibility of miracles, is likely to resolve itself into the study of operations of the consciousness and of individual receptivity.

It would be easy to quote passages from the New Testament in confirmation of the opinion that the nature of truth must vary with the subject to whom it is presented; but it would appear to have been left to the present age both to study the meaning of that proposition, and to deduce therefrom consequences which will be favourable to charity and concord.

SPEECH BY SIR DYCE DUCKWORTH, M.D., LL.D.

Ladies and Gentlemen,—My duty, I think, is to express in your name, and certainly for myself, our sense of the great value of the address which has been made this evening. In coming from so great an authority on so great and important a subject, and being in itself of a nature so subtle and so difficult, I think that nobody would be prepared, immediately after hearing the delivery of this address, to get up and debate it or consider it at any length. The subject demands that we should have it in print before us, and read it carefully and ponder over it, because I take it as a very important document contributed on this question, which no doubt attracts attention nowadays more than ever (a fact for which we may be thankful)

amongst the most learned theologians and students all over Europe. We have had a contribution, as I say, from a great master on the subject, which will well repay the most careful perusal, and which I venture to think hardly anybody present is really fit to criticise in detail. In reference to these meetings, I think that the presence of so many as I see here before me to-day must certainly be gratifying to those who have organised these assemblies. It has come within the knowledge of all of us that the first of this series has attracted wider attention than was perhaps anticipated at the time it was carried out, and I see no reason for regret in the attention which has been thus directed to that particular lecture, and to this course of lectures. We may be quite sure that good will come of it. I think some of us were sorry to see a man whom we consider to be one of the greatest masters of science in this country, and perhaps in Europe, attacked as he was by other men, when we might have expected that a controversy arising on such points would be conducted with even-mindedness, and certainly more courtesy. But for myself I am quite content to rest in the shadow of so great a man as addressed you on that occasion, and would say at once very humbly that I would take his side in the controversy which came up then. In these days there is a great unsettling of faith—in fact, I am almost prepared to say a great absence of faith—and therefore it is that Associations such as this are bringing these matters forward, specially before young minds before they have come to conclusions on these very vital subjects. Especially is it important, in an Institution like this, that questions of this kind should be brought forward.

I do not know why I have been particularly selected to occupy this chair to-day. I take it as indicating that I, as a representative of the great profession of medicine, am interested in Christianity, in the Christian faith. I have no hesitation in declaring myself a

convinced Christian, and I think I may say, for certainly the greater number of the members of my profession in England, that that is the faith which they hold. That is not the case in many parts of the Continent. I remember giving an address in the East End of London some years ago. At the end of it a German doctor came up and spoke to me, and said he was perfectly astounded to hear an English doctor express himself dogmatically upon matters relating to the Christian faith. He said, "In my country we have no faith, we doctors." The statement was not new to me, for we know that the Christian faith is largely divorced on the Continent from the beliefs of scientific men. Amongst scientific men generally there are many who may be regarded as freethinkers or agnostics, and who profess not to see their way to hold the simple faith which Christians hold, and who apparently do not care very much about the matter. There have been great scientists who have had various difficulties on the subject, and we have a large number of less eminent scientific men who have adopted the state of mind of those great men as a kind of cult, and who think it becoming and almost necessary to follow the example of some of those men who have had their own difficulties. With regard to those who are uncertain in their beliefs on the subject of Christianity, the result is sometimes the effect of what I may call a kind of colour-blindness. These people are honest—they cannot see. They wish for absolute demonstration and emphatic certainties, without which their habit of mind prevents them from accepting the tenets of Christianity, or holding what we call the faith. They cannot see their way in the same direction as you and I can see it. Further, I would add that to have faith is not a matter of experimental proof, or of experimental demonstration. In the matter of Christian faith, I think it is too often forgotten that it is as well an affair of the heart as of the mind. It is impossible to

hold the Christian faith without having the heart engaged in the matter, and at the basis of all you must have perfect humility and a recognition of the limits of human penetration. These limits, no doubt, are being narrowed as years roll by. The limits to human penetration are not what they were two thousand years ago. Many things are being revealed and made known to us by science, day by day, year by year. But I for myself see no contradiction and antagonism between science and revealed religion. Belonging to a great profession, the knowledge of which is based upon all the sciences, we are ready to receive anything brought before us at any time, we are prepared for any revelation of truth, nothing will astonish us, nothing is too wonderful for us; but these will have no effect in shaking our faith in Divine things. We believe, on the other hand, that, as a result, our faith will be rather built up than lessened and destroyed. I firmly believe that that is the mental condition alone in which our art can be best practised. I should feel sorry for any man practising my profession who went to the bedside of the sick or dying without Christian faith. I am free to say, after many years of experience now, that the best and happiest death-beds I have ever seen were those of Christians—and I have seen many die in all lands and under all conditions.

What I think we want at the present time is an attitude of greater humility. We should recollect, as I have said, that to hold the faith is not to demand an absolute demonstration. We know that faith is the evidence of things unseen, and that the gift of it comes to those who will try and believe and reverentially seek aid that their hearts may be opened to see and believe. After all, Christianity is a thing of practical proof. On a great occasion one of my greatest friends in the profession, Sir Andrew Clark, addressed an assembly like this, and after a long discourse said, "Let me recommend you to try the

Christian faith." No doubt, therein lies one of the greatest secrets in this matter as to the building up of ourselves in the faith. "He that believeth on the Son of God hath the witness in himself." Let a man try and practise the Christian cult, and as he does so and works it out day by day, so will conviction come to him and come absolutely in no other way than by trying it—to copy the life of the Divine Master. In that way alone, I believe, can people put themselves into the right attitude to find and hold faith. That is the reverential, humble attitude which will believe that there are many things hidden from us, but that many of those things will be revealed by those who come after us, and that over all, and behind all, is the great All in All, the director of all affairs, with all power, the Master of all hearts, our great and Divine Father.

SPEECH BY COLONEL WILLIAMS, M.P.

I HAVE great pleasure in proposing a cordial vote of thanks to Professor Margoliouth for the very able address he has given us. I cannot tell you what a great privilege it has been for me and, I am quite certain, for others on the platform, with grey beards and older minds, to come to such an assembly as this—of young women and young men—not gathered together by compulsion but voluntarily coming to listen to an extra University lecture, and to study such a subject as this. It is important for all of us to get into our minds some of the greater reasons for the faith that is in us; something which may not only establish us in the faith, but still more—and here is the value of these lectures—something which we may pass on to others; because there is no one in this room who does not constantly come into contact with other minds, and who will not in a short time hear some of the scoffs at religion which come from careless minds and lips. Having spent this time together, we are

better fitted for going out and doing that which our Christianity and our humanity lay upon us—doing all the good in the world we possibly can, mentally and spiritually, for the cause of our common Christianity.

Professor Margoliouth has treated a very difficult subject in a very masterly and yet very simple manner —in a manner which has given us very distinct lines of thought upon which we can complete for ourselves investigations into this great subject. There are two remarks that he made in his lecture that very much struck me. First of all, he said that it was the function of religion to turn an oral tradition into a written tradition, an oral language into a written language. That is just what we find at the present time. There are many languages, good strong languages, languages with a history and traditions of their own, of which we knew nothing and heard nothing until the missionaries went amongst the people who speak them ; and when the missionaries went and found the need for translation of the Scriptures into those languages, we found out what those languages were. The Professor made another remark—that it is the tendency of a new religion to drive out an old one. Some people tell us that Christianity is a new religion altogether, that the New Testament and the Old Testament have no connection with one another. Had that been the case, according to that law mentioned by Professor Margoliouth, the New Testament would have turned out the Old Testament. But it has been proved that the New Testament is only a complement to the fulfilment of the Old Testament, and therefore the New Testament has not driven out the Old Testament ; they are shown to be two parts of one and the same revelation.

THE WITNESS OF HUMAN EXPERIENCE

By the Rev. R. E. Welsh, M.A.[1]

Christianity comes to us in three ways. (1) It comes through literary records, survivals of primitive literature which the new religion created. These documents and their value do not fall within the scope of my subject. (2) It comes as a factor in our environment. Born in Christendom, we find it round us, and it finds us, when we arrive here—an institution, a tradition, an influence, a complex web of elements woven into social and national life. And (3) it comes to individuals as a personal experience, of which a man can never altogether convey the secret to his fellow. Before it was either a literature or a history, before it had exhibited itself on the wide fields of community-life, or worked itself into writings, it was a personal experience. And probably the first and the last attestation of its truth that a man receives is something intimately personal—although many other evidences may come in to give it confirmation.

Christianity is one of the imperial and imperious factors in human life as lived by us. Its operations, alike in numberless individual experiences and in social and corporate life, have produced an enormous mass of materials to be analysed and appraised.

[1] An Address delivered on May 21st, 1903.

With what criteria shall we put it to the test?

Professor William James of Harvard—latest and freshest of trained psychologists—in his recent notable book, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, treated on scientific lines, lays down two criteria for our use as tests—(1) "Immediate luminousness," and (2) "Moral helpfulness."

I.

The first criterion, "Immediate luminousness," is scarcely within the field of my subject; but a word about it, to point a path for thought.

It is itself an experience, very intimate and difficult to reproduce, but such as helps us to overleap the intervening ages and leagues which seem to put us at so grave a disadvantage in estimating all that clusters round the name "Christ."

For the moment assume nothing regarding the authenticity of the Gospels, except of course that they descend from early times. Now open these four panels, and let the portrait look out into our eyes. Whether everything in them be reliable or not, the Face that looks out at us from these portraits has something immediately luminous and instantly convincing, combining strange colours and extraordinary elements, yet self-consistent and harmoniously unique. Intellectual questionings are ready to intervene and raise difficulties; but let these be left aside for the moment. Let the Face produce its own immediate and unqualified imprint, and mark how our intuitions receive the swift impression of living reality; there is something that goes home to the childlike in us. And we can never cast that Face out of our eyes; and, no matter what literary or scientific problems may arrest belief, we can never lose

the singular appeal He makes to something inarticulate and fine in our deeper nature. Meet Him just as He appears there—let Him look out at you, into you—and, however singular He seem and almost incredible the story, there is an impression of veracity and mystic power left on your spirit.

These intuitions in men of many times and conditions are a swift judge of trueness, and are not in the long run deceived. You may safely accept the "authority of the optic nerve," answering the "immediate luminousness" of Christ.

From the very nature of the case we are bound to take into account the witness of the inner consciousness, of the persistent phenomena in the human heart. Renan was asked, in regard to his theories, "What do you do with sin?" "I suppress it," he airily replied. But it is there all the same. And we cannot measure Christianity without taking account of the sore evil that infests human life, of the needs and persistent instincts that will insist on making themselves the largest factor in experience. Christ exists—it is the *motif* to which His story is set—just to deal with these sore disorders and meet these intuitions of "the organ of spiritual discernment," and it is vain to estimate the truth in Him apart from these irrepressible demands of the heart. When heart and conscience awake, they have something to say towards the verdict, something as scientifically valid as intellect and science itself.

Before proceeding to discuss the central problems of our proper subject, let me, by the way, mention a case in point, which ought to interest students here in University College—the case of the first woman to gain for women students admission to its classes. She,

Ellen Watson—I can but outline her story—won the Rothschild Exhibition and the principal prize in Applied Mathematics and Mechanics. She profoundly revered and was influenced by Professor W. K. Clifford of this College, enthusiastically calling him "the Master." He, once a High Churchman, had thrown Christianity to the winds; to his eyes it evaporated under scientific tests. With frantic, pathetic candour, he admits and deplores the loss :—

"We have seen the spring sun shine out of an empty heaven to light up a soul-less earth ; we have felt with utter loneliness that the Great Companion is dead. We are all to be swept away in the final ruin of the earth. The thought is a sad one ; there is no use in trying to deny this. But, like All-Father Odin, we must ride out gaily to do battle with the wolf of doom."

Strange, chill, ironic "gaiety"!

Ellen Watson started from a similar position. "I do not need religion," she used to say then ; "science thoroughly satisfies me. I stand far below many humble Christians. But I do not reject Christianity because it seems to me unlikely or defective morally, or for any such reason. Only I feel it is not what I need." She frankly admitted that "of the whole mass of Christian evidence she was in total ignorance." Enlightenment came from an unexpected quarter.

Her hero-professor, like herself, showed symptoms of that disease, consumption, which kisses the body before it kills it. Her heart was appalled as she saw him fade. "This morning I said Good-bye to him, I fear for the last time. It is difficult not to despair and ask what good there is in living when this is all." Soon he died

in a distant land, and the shock roused the dormant heart in his pupil. "Is this all?" was the question that dominated her thinking. Was she a mere atom in the soul-less universe, a mere victim of universal laws? She could not believe, yet, "I wish your life were mine," she wrote to a Christian friend. This heart-hunger became more imperious, whetted by the study of "In Memoriam," intensified further by the sudden loss of another student in whose researches she was interested. These shatterings of love and hope stirred an aspiration which rose above the limits of science,

> "And like a man in wrath, the heart
> Stood up and answered, 'I have felt.'"

Taking part of her B.Sc. degree, she had to flee for health to Cape Colony, where I visited the school in which she taught and saw the place where she was laid at her early death. But already she had come to write, "I believe in God because I have felt the Divine Presence. And if to love and adore is to believe, I believe in Christ. Yet I struggled against it for a long time." In the act of repeating the words, "O Lamb of God, Son of the Father, that taketh away the sins of the world," her voice and her life ceased. To the last she retained her reverence for science. But a change had come over her, she said, "like an awakening from a dream to a reality, and the sense that we have been the dreamers."

I give the case—because it was one of yourselves—to show that the waking of the instincts of the innermost life may bring experiences which carry evidence and conviction not to be denied. Christ must be

sufficiently authenticated in outward fact; yet the spirit within must have its "say" also.

"I wish I could believe that beautiful religion of yours," was the wistful exclamation to me of one who formerly was a distinguished teacher of science in this college. That "wish" tells of the intuitions which bear witness to Christ even when science dries up belief, and such witness has its scientific value.

II.

Now take the second criterion named.

The moral product of Christianity, the effect produced in individual experience and in the history of communities, must be one of the various witnesses in the case. Professor James has a way of putting the case crisply. "The true," he says, "is what works well, over the whole"—*i.e.* over a large field of experience.

How, then, has Christianity "worked"—Christianity not necessarily as identified with Churches and professional ecclesiasticism, but in its ruling spirit and its original purity? What have been its characteristic products?

By the way, this moral test is itself largely a product of the Christian spirit, which has affected our standards and implanted an ethical factor in our measurement of truth. The *moral* outcome of a system or a faith is not a criterion among pagan religions; it is largely a creation of Christian influences, and is itself a sign of their quality, of the ethical element contributed by Christianity.

1. Apply the criterion on the scale of History.

Just because the field is so overwhelmingly extensive, I must not even begin here to delimit its bounds, but shall ask you to give weight to what independent students have said in summarising the conclusions to which their special studies have led.

The late Professor Romanes—long an agnostic, but swinging back to convinced Christian faith towards the end—declared :—

"It is on all sides worth considering (blatant ignorance or base vulgarity alone excepted) that the revolution effected by Christianity in human life is immeasurable and unparalleled by any other movement in history."—*Thoughts on Religion*, p. 162.

With more poetic license, Jean Paul Richter recognised the world-influence of the Majestic One, Who, he said, "being the Holiest among the mighty, and the Mightiest among the holy, has lifted with His pierced hand empires off their hinges, has turned the stream of centuries out of its channel, and still governs the ages." And Emerson speaks of "the unique impression of Jesus on mankind, whose name is not so much written as ploughed into the history of the world."

Both Gibbon and Mr. Lecky (in his great book, *History of European Morals*)—neither of them writing from an ecclesiastical standpoint—have sufficiently exhibited the outburst of new life when primitive Christianity entered and conquered imperial Rome. I need not describe the luxury and the corruptions and shameless vices which darkened Roman society—human life cheap; virtue, chastity, domestic unions, a fig for them! Women and slaves and children held at the whim and passion of masterful men! The worst

passions of the people glutted by gladiatorial shows of blood—even gentlefolk gloating over the sensations of wounded victims *in articulo mortis*! There certainly were good men and good elements at the heart of it all; but the Stoics, with all their wisdom and high moral insight, were impotent to leaven the community for its recovery.

Into this debased paganism Christianity entered, and in spite of cruel misrepresentation and sufferings, spread and gradually poured new moral life into the community. The new religion regenerated a decadent society. What it did for woman, the home, the slave, the useless folk, and the wastage of society, let Mr. Lecky be left to tell, and "Quo Vadis" to illustrate in a tale. Max Müller said, "Humanity is a word which you look for in vain in Plato or Aristotle; the idea of mankind as one family, as the children of one God, is an idea of Christian growth." Yes, and that Humanitarianism which sceptics often nowadays seek to substitute for religion is itself a spirit infused into them and all of us by Christianity. The great body of altruistic feeling and service of humanity which has worked as the salt of society, its good Samaritan, is the outcome of the Christianised heart, as Dr. Benjamin Kidd has been showing. The Romans would have been astonished to see our modern engines of warfare, and not less astonished to see the Red Cross Brigade at the rear of the fighting forces for the relief of the wounded. Christianity has passed to some extent into the very code of laws of the European nations and the roots of the corporate life, contributing their finer elements. It has been the originator of ideals, creative of an elusive spirit, which, though impalpable and during

certain periods checked and overborne, survives all decay and rises again to animate the ruling public mind. Not always in the Church—official Christianity has often been a mixed quantity, and the Christian mind you might find sometimes outside the ecclesiastical pale more than within it. It may not have been the Church which promoted the movement for the abolition of slavery in modern times. But those who led the campaign had drunk deep at Christian springs. You cannot shut up the Christian spirit within the walls of an organisation. Deal as you like with the official organised religious system—its merits and demerits form another question, not vital to the case of Christianity; but this remains true, that the spirit of the Founder has always risen from its tomb of corruptions again, and become a wholesome, fertilising, and elevating force, like ozone in the air and actinic rays in the light. There are staggering evils in the civilisation of so-called Christendom—which is not half Christian in tone and character; but against these there is always a deep and wide protest, such as was not known in ancient Rome, and is not known in pagan lands to-day; there is a strong Christian mind that bans these sinister disorders, and *that* is prophetic of a victory yet to be won over them.

Is Christianity the cause, or is it the effect, of the moral ascent in western civilisation? It came first in time, in Rome's decay, before the renascence of civilisation, and it operates before our eyes in barbaric lands to-day as the spring of a new regenerate society. Even if it just rose and survived among the highest races and marched in combination with the most advanced civilisation, that in itself would stamp it with the imprimatur

of time and experience, giving it "the warrant of the ages." But it is more than a mere mechanical combination; it is in chemical combination with the best elements in social and public life. There are many good factors in the community besides those that spring out of Christianity—God is in His world in many ways. Yet, when Christianity disappears or loses hold, the visible effect is, as it always has been, social disintegration. This is so well recognised by disbelievers that, while they deny or doubt for themselves, numbers of them wish to uphold the superstition as a useful police force.

I shall have to ask the question in our next circle of enquiry—I merely hint it as the imperative question here: Could such humane and beneficent results be the outcome of a fortunate delusion? Has a fiction done more than anything else to save the community? Could something historically false be the factory of social regeneration and permanently the inspiration of the best in corporate life? Would it be a public calamity if this fortunate fiction were lost, if the truth, the truth as the sceptic knows it, were to become known to the people? If the calamity of social disintegration follows, it is a sign that the unfortunate "truth" is, after all, a deleterious error. Nothing but what is fundamentally true can permanently and on the large scale of history serve the highest interests of mankind.

2. Apply this criterion, "How it works," to Personal Experience.

It is beyond dispute that, in the experience of numberless individuals, and these among the sanest and best, the greatest moral dynamic that they have

known has come to them under the name of Christianity and its Founder. Interpret the signal facts as we may, we see men whose lives and character have been completely changed for the better, their settled natural habits overpowered, their dispositions reversed, a new stream of tendency started and setting back the old stream. Here is a dynamic that has proved itself stronger than the opium-habit, the drink-habit, the lust-habit, stronger than the forces of self-love. It seized Augustine, conquered his vices, and reconstructed him like a new man. It turned the wild scapegrace sailor John Newton into the devout writer of Christian hymns. In Colonel Gardiner, Raymond Lully, and multitudes of whom these are but a few signal specimens, we witness the same change of character and life—sometimes in a dramatic revolution, more frequently in the unostentatious rise of a regenerated spirit and the development of a type of manhood whose best is rooted and nourished in Christian soil.

Here is "Mark Rutherford" (Mr. Hale White), himself a disbeliever in the creeds, saying:—

"I can assure my incredulous literary friends that years ago it was not uncommon for men and women suddenly to wake to the fact that they had been sinners, and to affirm that henceforth they would keep God's commandments by the help of Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit. What is more extraordinary is that they did keep God's commandments for the rest of their lives."

Professor Romanes was constrained, on scientific principles, to take account of these phenomena of experience—experience which, he said, "has been repeated and testified to by countless" numbers "of

civilised men and women in all nations and all degrees of culture. . . . In all cases it is not a mere change of belief or opinion; this is by no means the point: the point is that it is a modification of character, more or less profound. . . . To pure agnostics the evidence," he says, from these changed lives, "lies in the bulk of these psychological phenomena, shortly after the death of Christ, with their continuance ever since, and their general similarity all over the world."

Would all doubts have vanished if we had witnessed a miracle of nature in Galilee? I question it. These changed lives and regenerated characters have all the appearance of moral miracles; and, let me ask, Which is easier, which is a profounder measure of Divine power—to bid a lame man rise and walk, or to transmute a bad man and his settled habits into sterling goodness of character?

The moral miracle is more *of kind* with Christ's own teaching and aims, and really a higher test than material wonders.

One of the earliest sceptical assailants of Christianity, Celsus, wrote contemptuously of the Christians for inviting and hospitably dealing with "bad men" and the like—implying that the ethical philosophers showed their superiority in drawing the reputable and finer minds. But the "bad man" laid at the wise man's door is just *the test-case*, is the last of all the world's problems: Who or what can draw him and re-make his character? Celsus said:—

"Those who are disposed by nature to vice, and accustomed to it, cannot be transformed by punishment, much less by mercy; for to transform nature is a matter of extreme difficulty."

Yes, indeed ; but Origen answered well :—

"When we see the doctrine Celsus calls foolish operate as with magic power, when we see how it brings a multitude at once from a life of lawless excesses to a well-regulated one, from unrighteousness to goodness, from timidity to such strength of principle that, for the sake of religion, they despise even death, have we not good reason for admiring the power of this doctrine?"

In fact, to speak after the manner of Ritschl and his influential school to-day, Christ is certified as a fact of consciousness. And wherever the experience of that consciousness has been quick and original, and not merely conventional, it has shown itself the dynamic ever tending to regenerate or mature good character, or to become the artist of the graces.

But this personal experience, it is urged by J. S. Mill and others, is valid only for the individual himself, and can certify nothing to the bystander. Yet, although it carries its full convincing power only to the subject himself, it may be a secondary experience to those in close enough touch to receive the subtle impression and scintillations of the changed life and Christian cult. The Christ-consciousness *shows through* in open character, and its verifiable products may be studied objectively.

True, these interior impressions and experiences are open to capricious interpretations. You cannot rely on what each man declares he has felt or knows in his soul. This evidence is often the "asylum ignorantiæ," the refuge of fanatics, obscurantists, and esoteric enthusiasts who are victimised by the projected shadows of their own abnormal impressions. Many of the

things vouched for by individual consciousness have to be sifted out as unscientific.

But take a wide range of these experiences of the Christian dynamic; see what occurs on the scale of large numbers, under different conditions, in different ages and races, in history and experience, what is constant as a power for good, what is certified by men sane and reliable, what "works well" in visible life: and such experience cannot be discounted as personal caprice. Here we have experiences which recur, which show persistence under all sorts of conditions, and a marked moral solidity in positive products. Nature does not deceive us in these persistent and lasting experiences. Are not the signal, varied, recurring experiences associated with Christ, and working out in life and character, valid and strong presumption in favour of Christianity as vital truth? Mr. Lecky, as detached historian, has reason to say that it (Christianity) has been "the most powerful moral lever ever applied to the hearts of men."

We must not forget, however, that all these religious experiences and revolutions in personal life are accounted for by some as the illusions of mere physiological change. Paul's vision on the way to Damascus is called "a discharging lesion of the occipital cortex, he being an epileptic." As Professor James puts it, this—

"Medical materialism snuffs out Saint Teresa as an hysteric, Saint Francis of Assisi as an hereditary degenerate; George Fox's discontent with the shams of his age and his pining for spiritual veracity it treats as a symptom of a disordered colon. Carlyle's organ-tones of misery it accounts for by a gastro-duodenal catarrh. All such mental over-tensions, it says, are,

when you come to the bottom of the matter, mere affairs of diathesis (auto-intoxications most probably), due to perverted action of various glands which physiology will yet discover. And medical materialism then thinks that the spiritual authority of all such personages is successfully undermined."

But if we must apply the principle to these cases, we must apply it all round. In that case, as Professor James shrewdly answers, the liver must be supposed to "determine the dicta of the sturdy atheist as decisively as it does that of the Methodist under conviction anxious about his soul. When it alters in one way the blood that percolates it, we get the Methodist, when in another way we get the atheist form of mind." Even the sceptic's disbeliefs, the medical materialist's scientific doctrines on the matter, are under this theory as much a product of glands and auto-intoxication as the experiences of the Christian! So reason itself is reduced to pathology, and this instrument of intelligence with which we are trying to interpret life is mere functioning of matter, and we are left looking in each other's faces, wondering if we are chattering automata, talking gibberish; and so we had better go home and ask no more questions! It is the *reductio ad absurdum* of all attempts to find an intelligent interpretation of human life.

These moral miracles and Christian experiences are not mere spindrift on the river's surface, "bubbles on the foam which coats a stormy sea, floating episodes made and unmade by the forces of the wind and water"—what Professor Clifford called "epiphenomena." They are too constant, typically identical, (while various in mode), sane and tested, to be aberrations and illusions.

It is equally true that psychological analysis, such as Professor James himself offers us in so fresh and skilful a form, does not dissolve the significance of these moral miracles, and, as he confesses, does not evaporate their authority. If these spiritual crises and changed lives arise as, say, the eruption of the subconscious self, we have only thrown the problem back one step farther. When we *trace the phenomena* and the modes in which changes emerge and crystallise, we do not *account for* them. To tell "How" does not answer "Why?" and "Whence?" It is possible to carve the human trunk and dissect the brain until one loses conviction of the reality of a living spirit that inhabited all; and it is equally possible to grub at the roots of beliefs and experiences and superstitions until one loses the confidence that there is sure truth at the heart of them—loses, indeed, the sense of the vital force and beauty which strike the common bystander. We have to sift all for the sake of sound discrimination, but again to stand back and get the broad impression of the living whole. Analyse and trace the method and course of it all with the aid of the surest psychologist; still there remain the broad, solid, lasting experiences which cannot be dissipated by mere analysis. While theorists are refining and dissecting till to their eyes the whole thing is evaporated, the Christian dynamic is going on working those same moral miracles in greater or less degree, and the thing is "working"—*solvitur ambulando.*

Now, do these experiences and moral miracles imply a supernal power in their source in Christ?

It is remarkable that paganism, even the wise among

the ancient pagans, could work no moral miracle on the bad man. Carlyle wrote (in *Sartor Resartus*, II.):

"The Old World knew nothing of conversions; instead of *Ecce Homo* they had only some *Choice of Hercules.*"

Ethical culture, for all the good service it renders on its own field, lacks the dynamic to produce these moral revolutions and this spiritual type of manhood. Like the Stoic philosophy of Seneca and Marcus Aurelius, it is for the wise, and has no seizing appeal for the lost man. This new power for good burst into activity, as Professor Romanes saw, under and after Christ, and has been a distinctive feature of His activity through succeeding times.

Is it the explanation of the peculiar potency of Christ, that He touches, exploits, works with things so intimately and intensely human and universally appealing as conscience, with the fears of guilt, love, life, death, the mystery of the unseen—the raw elemental materials and primary constituents of man's life? That, however, by itself would rather show that Christ had grip of the ultimate facts of existence, and had unique mastery over the springs of human nature. But further, Ibsen and Zola and Tolstoi have worked with the raw materials of human nature, dealt in the elemental contents of life; yet they can only expose, and do not heal. Whence the unparalleled regenerating power in Christ's treatment of the human case? There is something more than intimate handling of vital emotions and fears of human nature; there are actinic rays in His light that tell; a supernal element of power that is curative and purifying.

Is it something latent in human nature waiting to be "tapped" by some happy ideal embodying our deeper instincts? But whence the special power of Christianity to "tap" these latent instincts, to draw that subconscious life? What gives the *differentia* to Christ, producing results which no other has produced?

Or, when we point out the ineffectiveness of moral teaching by itself—with Matthew Arnold for witness—does this mean merely that men are still so undeveloped that they need some fiction to give vivid impersonation to ethical truth, some concrete ideal in a tale to wing the moral element into the imagination and set it warmly in the human heart? But, even then, if partly true, is not that a proof of reality rather than of illusion?

> "Wisdom dealt with mortal powers
> Where truth in closest words shall fail,
> When truth embodied in a tale
> Shall enter in at lowly doors."

"And so the Word had breath." The ideal of goodness needs to be made personal and embodied, incarnated in personality; and, in a universe so full of scientific wonders, is it so very strange if the universe of which our spirits are a part has its own wonders in that embodiment of the Divine?

But may it not be only the ideal, floated into our thoughts in the traditional name of Christ, that tells for good? In that case the historical reality of the story does not matter. So argued the late T. H. Green, who said that, more than two generations after Paul, a spiritual interpretation was given to the ethical teacher, Christ, which lifted Him out of the region of history, and fixed Him as a Divine ideal in the

purified conscience.—Thus men pathetically try to retain Him in some form, and cling even to a ghost!

To this there are answers of two kinds.

(1) The literary evidence, although outside our present field, may be briefly suggested—one item, at least. We have authenticated records of Christian experience so close upon the time of Christ as not to leave an interval sufficient for the development of such a legendary ideal.

The earliest documents relating to Christianity—four letters in the correspondence of a contemporary of Christ—are pronounced indisputably genuine by practically every sceptical authority worth considering. These letters take us up close to the very verge of the days of Christ. They were written within twenty-five to thirty years after Christ's death. During the interval their author, who had been a disbeliever and a persecutor of the first Christians in the Holy City, had become an ardent missionary of the faith, and had been proclaiming the Gospel round the Mediterranean. These documents are his letters to groups of converts who had been won and changed by the same agency some twenty-eight years before; and these letters show that already in years past Christianity has been proclaimed and experienced in Corinth and Galatia and Thessalonica. These documents, acknowledged to be authentic, exhibit a current conception of Christ as super-normal, miraculous, a Divine Saviour, and a solid and settled Christianity. And the interval between the events reported and the date when the letters were written is altogether too brief for the rise of a fond legendary illusion, much too brief a space of time for a myth to form into such a close-knit story as these letters reveal.

The theory of a slowly-woven ideal as the dynamic of goodness breaks down under this test alone.

(2) Our experience yields a second answer to the theory that a glorified ideal, floated into our life in the name of Christ but without full historical reality, is the effective power of Christianity, namely—Try it, try it in life, and see if it works out moral achievements like those we know under a living historical Christ Divine. The ideal looks fine to the imagination; but it is difficult to retain hold of a disembodied soul of Christianity. It is feeble in actual human dynamics; and while it may elevate the rarer individuals, it tends to grow thinly vapoury and vanish under the hard pressure of human struggle. To be morally potent and appealing the ideal must show the scars of living actuality upon it; in Luther's phrase, it must have hands and feet—aye, it must be objectively there, there all through the night, with the print of the nails in its hands.

Yes, the very soul of the dynamic in Christ lies in the red-stained actuality of it. Could an ideal clad in illusion hold its ground, and achieve what Mr. Lecky, who is open to no suspicion of religious bias, says Christianity achieved:—

"It was reserved for Christianity to present to the world an ideal character which, through all the changes of eighteen centuries, has filled the hearts of men with an impassioned love, and has shown itself capable of acting on all ages, nations, temperaments and conditions; has not only been the highest pattern of virtue, but the highest incentive to its practice, and has exerted so deep an influence that it may be truly said that the simple record of three short years of

active life has done more to regenerate and to soften mankind than all the disquisitions of philosophers, and than all the exhortations of moralists. This has indeed been the wellspring of whatever has been best and purest in the Christian life. Amid all the sins and failings, amid all the priestcraft, the persecution and fanaticism which have defaced the Church, it has preserved in the character and example of its Founder an enduring principle of regeneration."—*History of European Morals*, chap. iv.

Is it credible that an illusion of ideals woven by unenlightened Galileans could have hit the mark so surely and permanently, and could be the greatest effective energy for good in the world, in history, and in individual experience? Fortunate illusion, if it rose by the chances of a dreaming age, and created new men in holy character and revolutionised society! A composite, made up of a man and a fortunate delusion about him, could never survive and accomplish so much. The false could never lastingly serve the interests of the highest manhood, of truth and virtue.

Some men think it so fortunate a delusion under a "fortuitous concourse" of happy coincidences, that, like the sceptics of ancient Rome, they want to preserve the public faith in it as a moral police, as the best existing dynamic for good. Strange, incongruous testimony to the virtue lying in the lost dream! But the power of it visibly dies as soon as people suspect that it is being kept up as a useful make-believe.

Those who lose grip of Him lose visibly and confessedly a source of power and life. Even the enlightened and the emancipated suffer loss in many cases. Our eyes cannot be blinded to the signs in the Shelley and Godwin and Byron sceptical circles, nor to the

relaxing symptoms seen in Goethe and George Eliot. If these signs are visible in the mighty ones, we can infer what would happen in the mass of the common people if Christianity lost its veritable historicity and its hold. And I do not think it credible that what is regenerating when believed—and the loss of which is demoralising when dissolved in vapour or doubt—can be false. The true, be sure, is of one piece with the helpful, with what creates virtue and holy character. Even if you should be mistaken as to some details of fact, you are somewhere near the central point of truth when you are planted in what breeds the best in human life.

Character is one of the ultimate mundane tests of truth, in so far as truth is related to human life.

Is not that measure somewhat perilous for Christianity, for are there not good men and women outside the pale—good and noble-spirited disbelievers? The more the better! There are surely elements of good in the world lying in human nature and working in life outside any religion. Yet most of the best among unbelievers owe the best in them to the Christian ethics and influences which they, like all of us, inhaled from their birth. Huxley had a Christian parentage; Comte and George Eliot fed richly on the *Imitatio Christi*. They and the class they represent had the sap and blood of the old faith in them. Christian principles and influences are woven into their and our life, as Saxon is part of the language we all speak by custom. In the strength of the Christian bread eaten by our fathers and our race we and they may be able to go fasting in the wilderness forty days and forty nights, and still display some of the old virtues

and energies. It takes long to get Christian morality into the blood, and it takes long to get it out. Single cases of good disbelievers, like single cases of bad churchgoers, are no final measure of what they profess. You must see it tried independently on large numbers, and on society as a whole.[1] A negation—*any* disbelief—can never create *positive* gain ; it can sift and cleanse over-beliefs, but it takes a positive conviction of truth to produce positive character. And (as we discover in our own working experience) it is when we are at our best that we believe the best, and I think we ought to go by what we see clearest when we are at our best, not by what falls darkly on our brooding minds when we are down in the intellectual dumps !

SPEECH BY SIR T. BARLOW, BART., M.D.

Ladies and Gentlemen,—The numerous points to which the lecturer has referred were so rapidly stated that I am sure every one of us must have felt that we should like to ponder over them again, quietly reading them. At different periods of our life, and at different phases of our intellectual outlook, different sides of Christian evidence affect us very variously, but I am quite confident that all through our lives there is one kind of evidence which, if we ponder over it, never ceases to operate powerfully upon us ; that is, our remembrance of the best people that we have known. I would ask each one of us here to-night to try to think of the best people, to recollect what we can recall of the very best men and women whom we have known. In many cases, no doubt, these will be our parents. If we consider how they gradually overcame weaknesses, failings, and actual faults, amid disaster and trouble of every kind, and then reflect as

[1] See the author's *In Relief of Doubt.*

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to what was the guiding pole-star of their life, we shall not fail to gain most valuable information upon points which concern us. We may be quite certain that in the case of the very best people whom we have known, some portion, at any rate, of Christian truth was the motive power of their lives. It is perfectly true that in our experience we can recall, as the lecturer has remarked, the experience of good sceptics, but the more we know of these people—and far be it from me to disparage them—the more we know of their inner history and antecedents, the more we learn that they were under the abiding influence of an early Christian environment.

Now besides this reflection upon the best people we have known, there comes to us, as we go on through life —and it gradually increases, the nearer we come to its bourne—there comes back to us our own personal experience, and we gradually come to see that in proportion as we follow, as we really absorb, the principle of the Christian religion which we prize so much—just in proportion as we have taken in the spirit of Christianity, our life has become more and more satisfactory, or, shall I say, less and less unsatisfactory. And so from the experience of those we have known and from our own experience, there grows, day by day, week by week, year by year, the increasing conviction that the best of all evidences of the Christian verity is the evidence that the lives of those good people and our own lives bring to us. This is the only observation that I will make to-night, because I should like that each one of us should concentrate our view upon these two kinds of Christian evidence.

MATERIALISM OR CHRISTIANITY?

By the Rev. G. T. Manley, M.A.[1]

In this lecture I shall endeavour, first of all, to prove that the practical alternative which lies before most Englishmen who really desire to believe something is, Materialism or Christianity; and I shall then give some of the intellectual reasons which have led me to the rejection of the former and the acceptance of the latter.

It may seem a bold statement that the alternative is between these two alone. I am well aware that the number of religious systems is great, but I do not imagine that a large percentage of us would reject Christianity in order to become either Mohammedans or Confucianists, and for this practical reason I do not propose to enter into a discussion of these or similar systems.

Then there are those who say, "I believe in a personal God, but not in Jesus Christ as the Saviour of the world." I am inclined to think that those who hold this view form a very small class, much smaller than is sometimes believed. I think the position is generally found to be an unstable one, and it becomes necessary to drift further and further in one of two directions.

The first direction is that of pantheism. It is soon felt that God's personality is very difficult to reconcile

[1] An address delivered on May 28th, 1903.

with their assumption that He has made no revelation of Himself to us His personal creatures, excepting through nature, and consequently the personality of God becomes more and more of a mere intellectual dogma, and less and less of a reality of thought. They find that either they must give up altogether any attempt to recognise God in their lives, or they are forced to seek the expression of His will in the natural forces around them, which constitute the only revelation they will admit.

The next step of the process is to identify God with His manifestation in nature, and having no outstanding proof of God's love (like that supplied by the Cross of Christ), the whole of nature, good and bad, and especially the evolution of the human race, is laid hold of as being the expression of the Divine. And this is practically pantheism.

In practice the effect of this creed is so nearly that of Materialism, that there is no need to give it a separate treatment. It certainly escapes the more glaring philosophical absurdities of the latter creed, but it is like Materialism in three main features—namely, its denial of any essential distinction between right and wrong, its denial of the power of free will, and its complete failure to supply any motive for the love of God or man. All that is said against Materialism in these connections will equally apply to pantheism —at any rate, as seen in this country.

I do not believe that this view of life is at all common, and I think that the large majority of those who have no faith in Jesus Christ, and yet believe in a personal God, tend in the other direction, that of Agnosticism.

As long as belief in a personal God is practical and vivid, we shall yearn for some proof of His love upon the plane of our experience. I appeal with confidence to all who still cling to a belief in a personal God to say if this is not so? To men in such a frame of mind, the appeal of Christ must come with great force, "Let not your heart be troubled: ye believe in God, believe also in Me." My experience has taught me that those who retain a practical faith in God, generally become Christians in the end; whilst those who reject the appeal of Christ drift more and more towards unbelief in God also.

If God is not revealed in Christ, and if God is not identified with nature, there is a tendency, of which the experience of all must furnish numerous instances, for the belief in God to become vague and indefinite, and to fade more and more out of our everyday life and thought.

Another force at work in this direction is the existence of sin and suffering in the world. As long as we are assured that there is salvation and sympathy in Christ, we can dare to look the awfulness of sin in the face, and even to go forth to fight and conquer sin in His name. But where faith in Christ is absent, what an intolerable nightmare the misery of the world must be!

"How can God allow it all?" is a cry going up from hundreds of hearts; and in face of this question the one who does not believe in Christ finds that his God grows more and more of an abstraction, out of touch with the world; a mere philosophical toy, of no assistance in practical life.

This process is constantly to be seen going on around

us, and excepting where selfish indifference causes all speculation to stagnate, hundreds of mere theists are drifting into Agnosticism.

I want now to consider at length the position of the Agnostic, the man who says, "I am neither a materialist nor a Christian. I am unwilling to commit myself to either side; I simply say, 'I do not know.'"

Now, if this statement be made as a humble confession of ignorance, together with an earnest desire to learn—to study the words of Christ, for instance, in order to learn more about God—I should call the man who made it rather an "enquirer" than an "Agnostic." Such is the position of hundreds of thoughtful Indians at the present time who are studying Christianity for the first time; and it is the position of many a young Englishman at the stage when he first begins to think, and discovers that his faith up to the present has not been strictly "his," but his parents' faith, and when he determines to investigate the great questions of life for himself.

For the position of the enquirer I have nothing but respect and sympathy. But it is a stage of belief only, and not a resting-place; it is not a city where men settle, but a parting of the ways where they rest for a moment before deciding upon their destination.

I turn from this to the consideration of Agnosticism as a creed. Here ignorance of God is no longer humbly confessed as a shortcoming, but paraded as a necessity, and sometimes even as a virtue; it is the very apotheosis of ignorance! It is the position of the man who says aloud, "God is unknowable; no one *can* know about God"—and, alas! often adds in an undertone, "and I do not want to know about Him, either."

It is easily observed that this does not constitute a refusal to decide the question. It may parade under this form, but in fact, this is one of those questions that it is impossible to evade; and if we do not decide it in one way, we thereby decide it in another. In the same way a man may say to the tax-collector, "Income-tax! Why, sir, you must be aware that this involves very serious issues; I must assure myself first that the Government is spending the money as they profess, and I must investigate all the departments, etc., etc. Then, if everything is satisfactory and without a flaw, I will pay." If we could only persuade the Government that such a position was not a refusal to pay, but a justifiable suspension of judgment, I fear there would be a great increase of Agnostics on this question.

Christ comes to us, not demanding a tax, but offering us a free salvation from sin and the gift of eternal life; and to say to Him, "We know nothing of You, nor of the God Whom You say has sent You," is not a refusal to decide, but a decision to reject Him.

I wish to make this point clear—that Agnosticism, as a creed, is upon this side nothing but a rejection of Christianity; and I will quote to you upon this subject the words of that brilliant French writer and unbeliever, M. Ernest Renan. He says:—

"Apart from all disputed points of criticism, no one practically doubts that our Lord lived and that He died on the cross, in the most intense sense of filial relation to His Father in heaven, and that He bore testimony to that Father's providence, love, and grace towards mankind. The Lord's Prayer affords sufficient evidence upon these points. If the Sermon

on the Mount alone be added, the whole unseen world, of which the agnostic refuses to know anything, stands unveiled before us. There you see revealed the Divine Father and Creator of all things in personal relation to His creatures, hearing their prayers, witnessing their actions, caring for them and rewarding them. There you hear of a future Judgment administered by Christ Himself, and of a heaven to be hereafter revealed, in which those who live as the children of that Father, and who suffer in the cause, and for the sake of Christ Himself, will be abundantly rewarded. If Jesus Christ preached that sermon, made those promises, and taught that prayer, then any one who says that we know nothing of God, or of a future life, or of the unseen world, says that he does not believe Jesus Christ."[1]

M. Renan is right. The Agnostic does not leave the matter open; he decides against Jesus Christ.

This is the negative side of the subject. But Professor Huxley, the inventor of the term "Agnosticism," waxes very indignant if any one suggest that it is a mere negation. Of course, he admits the negative side, for in his account of his invention of the name he refers to the members of a certain Society, and says:—

"The one thing in which most of these good people were agreed was the one thing in which I differed from them. They were quite sure they had attained a certain "gnosis," had more or less successfully solved the problem of existence; whilst I was quite sure I had not, and had a pretty strong conviction that the problem was insoluble."[2]

But whilst in this place he defines Agnosticism as a mere negation, in another place he sets forth what he

[1] Quoted by Dr. Wace, *On Agnosticism*, p. 15.

[2] Huxley, *Science and Christian Tradition*, p. 238.

is pleased to call the positive side of his belief in a series of propositions. It may surprise you to be told that these propositions merely contain the better-known laws and hypotheses of biology.[1] They are entirely materialistic in conception. Curiously enough, Mr. Herbert Spencer divides his creed in the same way into the unknowable and the knowable; and, again, under the latter head he puts certain laws of biology and mechanics: possibly Huxley simply borrowed from Mr. Spencer's earlier work.

I am not concerned here to criticise Mr. Herbert Spencer's philosophy, nor to show the process of false reasoning by which he speaks of science first as all classified knowledge, and then narrows it down to mechanical or biological knowledge, to the neglect of history or philosophy; but my object is to point out that his ultimate analysis of the positive part of his creed is, like Huxley's, purely materialistic.

There is a phrase in his *First Principles* which he speaks of as the most general formula of evolution, and in another place as the "theory of things," as his "philosophy." When he comes to enunciate this formula he gives it the double honour of italics and inverted commas. Here it is:—

"*Evolution is an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion; during which the matter passes from an indefinite incoherent homogeneity to a definite coherent heterogeneity, and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation.*"[2]

I do not quote this in order to make fun of his phrasing, which is slightly worse than that of the

[1] *Ibid.*, pp. 44-54.

[2] Spencer, *First Principles*, p. 396.

Athanasian Creed, but to point out its absolutely materialistic character.

I think I have said enough to prove abundantly my present contention: namely, that Agnosticism, as expounded by its official sponsors, is upon the one side a denial of Christ's claims, and upon the other side a purely materialistic presentation of human knowledge.

Having shown, then, that Agnosticism and Materialism are for all practical purposes identical, I propose to examine this as a view of life upon which we may found our guiding principles.

But first I must guard against a possible misconception. I do not mean by Materialism the mere acceptance of the laws of mechanics, the permanence of matter and force, natural selection, and heredity. All educated people accept these, and Christian men have always been in the front rank of educated people. The difference between the Christian and the Materialist is that the former believes in a Father behind them and in Christ's revelation of that Father, whereas the Materialist either denies this or neglects it, ruling it out of the sphere of knowledge, and turns to these material facts and laws as self-sufficient.

This self-sufficiency of mechanics and biology to originate and account for all things is the distinctive tenet of modern Materialism.

I now ask the question, How far can Materialism satisfy three of the most permanent needs of man—salvation from sin, moral guidance, and a knowledge of the truth?

Upon the first and deepest need of our nature, salvation from the guilt and from the power of sin, Materialism stands as dumb as an idol of wood or

stone. The only reply that has ever been given, except by Jesus Christ and His followers, is, "Save yourself." A young Indian Christian in Allahabad was recently told by a theosophist: "You do not need a Saviour; you must save yourself." To which he replied by the pertinent question: "Then, sir, have you saved yourself?" But he got no answer.

We next ask what moral guidance for our actions we can derive from the same source. I will not detain you long upon this subject. Professor Huxley sums up his teaching in two words, "Consult nature."

Others give elaborate reasons for this advice. They tell us that originally there was no such thing as virtue, but only a number of animals struggling for existence. In the course of their struggles to preserve themselves or the race, certain habits, such as temperance, were found conducive to self-preservation, and hence came to be regarded as virtuous. And thus, lower material nature being the sole fount and source of virtue, the best moral guidance is summed up in this advice, "Consult nature."

I hesitate to think what would be the result if these good theorists ever thought of practising what they preach. We see the white ant preserving itself by the ruthless destruction of all that comes in its path; we see the eagle selecting for its attack animals too feeble or too young to defend themselves; or we may see the jackal pursuing its cowardly and disgusting thefts under the cover of the darkness. And, alas! all these methods of ruthlessness, of cowardice, oppression and deceit, can be seen practised by man in the cause of self-preservation, with much show of success as far as this world is concerned.

We may thank God that Professor Huxley did not derive his moral code from that lower nature which he professed to believe as its cause and origin, but from the Christian society in which it was his good fortune to be born and to spend his life.

There would be many Materialists who would sadly admit that they have no help for sinners, and but few directions for those who would be saints; but who would say, "Our creed is a dark one, but it is the sad truth and we must follow it."

But why, in the name of matter, should a consistent Materialist care about the truth? What, upon his theory, is truth? If evolution alone accounts for all, or is co-extensive with human knowledge, what can we know of truth, except that it is a very curious delusion which is part of a bye-product which we call speculative reason, caused by the evolution of that superior cunning which fitted man to survive in his struggle with the lower animals? Truth and untruth, reason and folly, rapine and honesty, have all been developed in the struggle for existence; they are all merely psychological sensations of certain motions of cerebral matter, induced, not to improve, but merely to perpetuate the species. They all stand on the same level, blind effects of blind causes, which we have the unpleasant opportunity to contemplate without the slightest power to interfere with.

Materialism is thus intellectual suicide, for it reduces truth to the beggarly elements of organic or inorganic matter, out of which it was aimlessly evolved. Once again we may thank God that the flesh-and-blood Materialist is better than his creed, and that he often has a desire for truth, strong and insistent—a voice

from that other eternal world which he denies, and the very proof within himself of the folly and falsity of the Materialism he professes but does not follow.

I turn, lastly, to Christianity—the faith of Newton, of Faraday, and of Kelvin. The very mention of these names is a sufficient proof that Christ's teaching is not contrary to science. Christianity is the friend of a true and broad view of science, but an opponent of those materialistic theories which would try to make us believe that there is no knowledge beyond the narrow limits of biology and astronomy.

The Materialist is like a man in a coal-mine, getting the precious coal indeed, but also maintaining that there is nothing else but the coal-mine and its darkness. Above in the free air stands the Christian, living in the light of the Sun of Righteousness. He acknowledges the existence and the usefulness of the coal-mine, but he begs his friend to accept his witness that the world is not bounded by the walls of the mine, and to believe that there is a sun whose light and power can be felt, even though the sun be beyond his present power of reach.

Thus it is that Christianity stands to Materialism, not as an opposing philosophical system, but as a witness asking to be heard, a witness borne first by Jesus Christ to God His Father and our Father, and then, by the Evangelists, Apostles, and all Christians, borne to the person and revelation of Jesus Christ.

The question that lies before you is this: Will you believe the witness of Jesus Christ? Will you listen to and investigate patiently His claims and our Christian experience?

I have tried to show that the barriers raised against

this investigation by Agnosticism or Materialism are artificial and based upon self-contradictory theories, which, if carried to their logical conclusion, would mean moral or mental suicide.

Science does not raise any barriers against belief in Christ. I do not intend to reopen the question as to whether science inclines a man to religion, as Newton and Kelvin think, or whether it is dumb upon the question; but I put before you this claim, that the witness of Jesus Christ and His followers *does* incline men to religion, and that the conclusions of astronomy or biology can never tend to exclude His words from our consideration.

Believe me, if you refuse to hear Jesus Christ, it is not because of your scientific learning, but by the deliberate choice of your own free will. And to those of you who are trying to hear all that Jesus Christ and His followers say, let me add, Do not be afraid of difficulties.

We Christians do not pretend to have solved completely the riddle of existence. We have much to perplex us, but our difficulties are only such as are common to all knowledge. The difficulties in reconciling the Synoptic Gospels are no greater than those which Darwin found in reconciling the apparently contradictory testimony of certain fossil remains; and our ignorance concerning much of the future life is paralleled or surpassed by our ignorance of the ultimate constitution of matter.

But whilst admitting the imperfection of our knowledge, we do know that Jesus Christ died for our sins and rose again for our justification; and we do know that we who believe on Him receive peace in our souls

and power in our lives; and we are not willing that our knowledge of the material world should make us either forget or despise our knowledge of the spiritual world. On the contrary, we regard all knowledge as one, and all truth as one; and we hold the one foundation of all truth and knowledge to be the eternal righteousness and wisdom of our God, the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ.

We will not let the lower forms of existence drag us down to their level—we would rather raise them up to ours; we will not judge the highest by the lowest, but the lowest by the highest; and we do not believe that matter and motion can do so much to explain the existence of Christ, as Christ can help us to understand the reason for the existence of matter and motion.

In conclusion, may I urge upon you here present to undertake this study of the claims of Christ, and to study them to a conclusion, and ask you to bring to your help two watchwords—Truth and Righteousness.

Do not analyse them, but believe in them, and you will find they do not fail; and as you lean on them, your faith will be strengthened—"*Solvitur ambulando.*"

And as far as in you lies, practise them. Tell the truth, do what is right; and if in the effort you find yourself unable to do this of yourself, then happy are you, for, just when you feel your own weakness, Jesus Christ will take you by the hand and say, "I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life."

SPEECH BY MR. AUGUSTINE BIRRELL, K.C.

Ladies and Gentlemen,—Upon the subject which Mr. Manley has presented to you with so much lucidity

and force, it would not be becoming in me to say anything. I am quite satisfied, in my own mind, that science and religion can never come together, unless and until science is willing to recognise the religious experiences of mankind as something which enters into the account; and that view has been presented to us this afternoon, with great force, by the lecturer. Religious experience has as old a history as mankind itself; and, although incapable of the proof and the demonstration which belong to external matters, nevertheless it is, in its own way, far more convincing than anything else. Therefore religion must always be based upon personal experience; and it must consequently always be open to the retaliation, "That experience is not mine." It cannot be got rid of, it cannot be disputed; nor can it be forced upon any person who remains impervious to its influence. Were men to rise from the dead, that would prove nothing of the truth or the morality of a revelation. An omnipotent God might, for aught we know, be an immoral God; and the miracles with which He enforced the creed He desired mankind to accept would not prove the morality of the revelation, but would only prove the omnipotence of the Creator. Every man, therefore, has to decide for himself, and within the realm of his own mind, whether a truth appeals to his nature or whether it does not; whether it makes for righteousness or whether it does not; whether it assists him in his outlook upon life, in his path through life, and in his relations with his fellow-creatures; and therefore we have now collected a huge possession of religious experience. We have it in this country; and I have no doubt that Mr. Manley finds it in the North-West Provinces of India. People have their religious experiences; and that is the witness to which they must appeal in support of their religious faith. Therefore it is that, of necessity, the apologists of Christianity make what are called personal appeals. They cannot put anything

under the microscope; they cannot, by figures upon a blackboard, work out the salvation of anybody's soul; and therefore it is that they appeal to experience. Hence is it, too, that they are open to the reply, "That experience is not mine." However, they have the centuries behind them, and they have the centuries in front of them. One thing that we may be perfectly certain of is this: that to the end of recorded time, men and women, in dealing with these vast problems of futurity, with the great mystery of life and the certainty of death, will be found—whatever may be the dogmas of science, whatever may be the revealed truths and demonstrations of science—they will be found hereafter, as Mr. Manley has been found to-day, appealing to the evidence of the human heart.

SOME EVIDENCES FOR THE RESURRECTION.[1]

By the Rev. C. W. Wilson, M.A.[2]

The purpose of this address is to set forth some evidence for the Resurrection of Jesus Christ. We do not attempt in this short space to give a full and complete proof of that great fact, but only to suggest some thoughts which make it possible reasonably to believe in it. A great writer has said that the Resurrection is one of the best authenticated facts in history; and, believing this to be true, our intention is to examine a portion of the evidence which makes it so. It is upon the one great miracle of the Resurrection that the apostolic writers stake the truth of Christianity (I. Cor. xv. 14).

If the Resurrection is a fact it carries with it all other miracles; while if Christ did not rise, no amount of other evidence will prove that he is the Christ. Modern scepticism has grasped the truth of this. It refuses to admit the fact, but recognises that belief in the Resurrection has been the mainspring of Christianity, and of incalculable importance in advancing its cause. Many theories have therefore been adduced with a

[1] An address delivered on March 5th, 1903.

[2] I am greatly indebted for the matter of this address to notes of Lectures given by the Rev. G. A. Schneider, M.A., on Apologetics at Cambridge in 1897.—C. W. W.

view to explaining it away. Let us examine some of them.

It has been suggested that the first teachers were impostors, and that they gave out that Christ was risen when they knew He had not.

Paley, in his "Evidences," shows how absurd is such an idea. What motive could they have? Is it likely that men would undergo voluntary poverty, untold sufferings and painful death for a tale which they knew to be a lie? At least, that which we know of their after-life proves that they were honest men.

Another theory advanced by the rationalists briefly is as follows. Christ did not really die. He was only six hours on the cross, and fell into a deathlike swoon. He recovered in the grave, came forth, was seen by His disciples, kept away from His enemies, and died quietly afterwards, and this was mistaken by His disciples for a Resurrection.

There are several objections to such a theory. In the first place, the Roman soldiers were experienced in crucifixion, and knew well the symptoms of death. We are told that they marvelled that He was already dead, which suggests the assembling of the band before His Cross, when one with a spear pierced His side, and it is not likely they would be deceived. We are also told, on the other hand, that the thieves were not dead, but brutally despatched. Secondly, is it likely that His disciples could mistake a man just recovering from a deathlike swoon for one risen from the dead and the conqueror of death? This is what they did believe, for it was this they preached and for this they suffered. And if this were the case, then it is impossible not to accuse either Christ or His

disciples of fraud. If He declared to them that He was risen when He had only recovered from a state of unconsciousness, He Himself must have kept at a safe distance while they ran the risks of proclaiming it. If He said nothing, and His disciples only imagined it, then they must have learned later what had really happened. For if he lived like other men, it must have been possible to trace His career. Yet they gave out that He had ascended.

We turn next to the theory which Renan held, that it was a vision of Jesus which the disciples fancied they had seen, and which caused them to teach and preach that He was risen. In this theory the vision was a purely subjective phenomenon—a mental process. The disciples expected He would rise; they longed so much to see Him that they thought they had seen Him, and mistook the creation of their own imagination for a sight of their Master actually risen from the dead. No question is raised as to their honesty and sincerity, but it is suggested that hallucination and imagination can account for their enthusiastic proclamation of the gospel which they preached. There are several objections to this theory. According to the principles of psychology, even the most credulous will not mistake the creatures of their own imagination for realities unless there is either a prepossession or an expectation.

The gospel narrative shows us plainly that there are no grounds for assuming this in the case of the disciples. They, like the rest of the Jews, expected the Messiah to be a great King upon the earth, and when they saw their Master die on the Cross all hope left them. The expression of the two on the road to Emmaus, "We

trusted that it had been He which should have redeemed Israel" (Luke xxiv. 21), may be fairly taken to represent the feeling of the main body of the disciples. They thought all was lost, and they did not expect Him to rise.

But it is suggested the priests remembered His prediction. Why not the disciples? To this our answer is that a guilty conscience always expects the worst, but men who have lost all hope do not readily expect or accept good news. Again, even Strauss admits that it needs some time to develope that state of mind in which such visions are seen. And yet only three days passed before they saw the Lord. Further, all the appearances were over in forty days, and by this theory they should have lasted much longer.

And now we have a question to ask. If Christ died but did not rise, what became of His body? It is futile to suggest that in the East a body would be unrecognisable even in so short a time, for the nail marks would still have been discernible. If the Jews had it in their possession, why did they not produce it? If the disciples had stolen the body the secret must have been known to numbers, and surely would have leaked out; and even if not, we must accuse them of fraud. And that Christianity should be built on the delusions of a few credulous fishermen who mistook their own fancies for facts is a greater miracle than Christianity itself.

Another theory, propounded by Kein, states that our Lord died on the Cross, but His body did not rise. The appearances, however, were not purely subjective, but had an objective cause. In other words the glorified spirit of Jesus produced manifestations to

prove to His followers that He still lived. These were mistaken by the disciples for bodily appearances. This theory carries us outside the range of what science and history teach, and is no more acceptable than the orthodox view. It is absurd to suppose that, although Christ could send messages to His followers, He could not give them the right impression. Surely He should have told them that His Spirit lived with God, while the message they received was that His body was risen from the grave.

So we find on careful examination that theory after theory breaks down, and we are compelled to admit that the most satisfactory explanation is that recorded in the Gospels. The strongest evidence, however, is not that of the Gospels, but of St. Paul. The general facts of St. Paul's life are not denied by any one, and even the severest school of German criticism admits the genuineness of his four epistles, Romans, I. and II. Corinthians and Galatians. We have therefore the advantage of being on ground uncontested even by our opponents. There was no doubt in St. Paul's mind that he had seen the risen Christ (I. Cor. ix. 9). Either he had, or else it was a delusion. Clearly on the road to Damascus he had no expectation or prepossession, and in the first chapter of his epistle to the Galatians he refers to the sharp break between his earlier and later life, and attributes it to the vision he had seen.

But, say our opponents, St. Paul was of an enthusiastic and excitable temperament. We reply by pointing out the calm judgment and cool-headed reasoning displayed in I. Corinthians xii., xiii. and xiv., which mark him out as a man of unswerving purpose, altogether free from excitement or fancy.

Strauss suggests that St. Paul's thorn in the flesh was undoubtedly epilepsy, and that the vision was a manifestation of this condition. In II. Corinthians xii. 7 St. Paul distinguishes between his visions and his stake in the flesh, and distinctly states that the latter was sent lest he be over-exalted by the former.

And again, was hallucination likely to account for so remarkable a change in life? He had stood by while Stephen was stoned, and remained unmoved by his splendid heroism. He had vigorously persecuted the Christians, "being exceedingly mad against them," and then suddenly and unexpectedly he himself becomes a devoted follower of Jesus, the Teacher whom he had despised.

From the epistles to the Corinthians we get, indirectly, much positive evidence. In I. Corinthians ix. St. Paul claims equality with the other apostles to defend his teaching. They do not challenge his claim, but admit that he has seen the risen Christ. In I. Corinthians xv. he enumerates the various appearances of Christ after His resurrection, and every one admits that the Gospels are of a later date than this epistle, so he could not possibly have copied. Here he challenges his readers to verify the fact for themselves, for Christ appeared to five hundred brethren at once, and the greater part of them are still alive. It must be remembered that he was writing to a very critical and sceptical community, and therefore would naturally have made very sure of his facts before he used them in argument. Still further, the whole of the teaching of the epistle is based on the Resurrection. It is the foundation of its morality (I. Cor. xv. 3, etc.), the proof of its veracity (I. Cor.

xv. 17), and the great cause of its buoyant hope (I. Cor. xv. 20), and this may justly be added to St. Paul's testimony.

We next turn to the words of Christ after His Resurrection. If Christ did not rise, who composed those sayings? If they are the product of ordinary Jewish minds, we should naturally expect them to bear some traces of the Jewish ideal, such as is laid bare in the words of the two on the road to Emmaus (Luke xxiv. 21). But instead of narrowness, bigotry, and limitation, they are the grandest of all sayings—not falling below the standard of the other words of the Master, but, as it were, setting a crown upon them all. Not Judea only, but the whole world, is the field for operation: "Go ye into all the world and preach the Gospel."

Another witness to the Resurrection is furnished by the existence of the Christians' Sunday. How came it about that Jews—for they were Jews—when they had to choose between keeping the Jewish sabbath and the first day of the week, chose the latter. At first both days were kept by Christians, but when the great division came between Christian Jews and the supporters of the old faith, the Christians gave up keeping the sabbath, the seventh day with its three thousand years of custom, and dedicated to the worship of God the first day of the week. Why? Because Christ rose on that day, and appeared on that day to the disciples, and thus had marked it for them as the special day of thanksgiving and praise. And in our own time, more than eighteen hundred years after, the day bears witness to the great fact.

The existence of the Christian Church in all ages,

in spite of persecution, opposition, and oppression, plainly asserts the fact that it could not have been founded on a lie. Its progress and expansion, especially in modern times, proclaim the truth of the Gospel message, while the change in the lives of men and women speak volumes for its power. After all, the surest test of genuineness is result, and resurrection from a life of sin to a life of righteousness add their testimony to the fact of Christ's Resurrection.

Finally, there is another proof, differing from those already considered in this—that it is capable in the case of any one individual of experimental verification. It is not easy to explain. It is almost impossible for one who does not know to understand the reality and power of it. Perhaps it can be best explained as follows. The scientist invents a theory, and testing it again and again and finding it invariably true, he comes to recognise his theory as a fact. In like manner, but in a much surer sense, the individual who acts upon the theory of Christianity comes to know with a certain knowledge the fact of the Resurrection. "He that doeth . . . shall know," is the oft-repeated cry of the apostle St. John, and this is but the echo of the Master's words, "He that followeth Me shall not walk in darkness, but shall have the light of life."

SUMMARY

I

Professor Henslow's Address is on Present-day Rationalism, with special reference to Darwinism. In it he points out the prominent part played by natural selection in modern unbelief, and the falsity of the assumption that Darwin is the authority for the modern view of natural selection. After pointing out how much of modern knowledge (*e.g.* the rotation and rotundity of the earth) is matter of inductive reference rather than of observation and experiment, the Professor quotes examples from certain modern writers who "out-darwin Darwin" in the attempt to attribute to "blind and unconscious agencies" the results of natural selection. This he shows to be opposed to Darwin's own view of the evolution of the world—"that grand sequence of events which our minds refuse to accept as the result of blind chance." Distinguishing evolution as a doctrine past dispute from Darwinism in its emphasis upon natural selection, and especially from the modern use made of the term, the lecturer proceeds to describe and discuss natural selection. He regards it as merely a registrar and in no sense a cause of the appearances and disappearances of which evolution is made up; and while he cites Darwin as being, unlike his modern followers, in substantial agreement on this point, he indicates what he regards as the two mistakes made by that scientist upon the subject: these are (1) the introduction of structure or form into the question of survival, and (2) the opinion that "Individual Differ-

ences" are a source of variety in nature. These errors he attributes to Darwin's observations being confined to animals and plants under domestic culture. Reiterating Darwin's disclaimer of atheistic inference, and indicating the importance which Darwin came to see must be attached to environment, the Professor describes what he calls the "True Darwinism," viz. (1) Variability, but with *no* indefinite result, and (2) Directivity or the power of response to environment. He then endeavours to show how the new argument from adaptation replaces the old argument from design, and how the abundant evidence of "directivity," if it does not prove a directing creator, at least must allow the entrance of the ordinary process of inductive inference, under whose guidance we are led to a definite theistic faith. Lord Kelvin's utterance in thanking the lecturer, in which he stated that "science positively affirms a creative power," is commented upon by Prof. Henslow.

II

In the second address Dean Wace treats of the Book of Genesis. Starting with its admitted unity of design, he indicates this to be the exhibition of God's relation to the world and the race, and traces the contents, whencesoever selected, from the story of creation to the establishment of the chosen people in its relation to the other nations whom it was to bless. These contents he shows to be corroborated by modern knowledge, emphasizing (*a*) the remarkable approximation of Genesis i. to the results of modern science, and its equally remarkable divergence from the polytheistic Babylonian myths to which it bears some literary resemblance. He repudiates the idea that Genesis i. is drawn from Babylonian sources, though the purification of these would be equally a proof of divine inspiration. He quotes Bacon as regarding the function of man in

relation to the world as exactly described in the closing words of the chapter, and shows how immediately the writer passes from the physical position to the moral condition upon which it depends. The story of the Fall he seems to treat as combined allegory and history. He shows (*b*) how the early chapters have acquainted every Jewish and Christian child with information as to the rise and progress of early civilisations hitherto else inaccessible, but now corroborated by Mesopotamian discoveries. Passing (*c*) to the patriarchal narratives, he first calls attention to the manner in which history has justified the predestined function of the chosen people as the channel of blessing to mankind, and insists in this connection on the supreme importance not only of monotheism and revelation, but of Covenant Relation as the distinctive feature of Jewish and Christian faith. The discovery of preserved contemporary writings he uses to justify belief in the historical character of the narratives, and condemns the attaching of importance to the discrimination of the several sources of compilation as irrelevant to the great moral purpose of the writer.

III

In the third address Professor Margoliouth deals with the compilation of the Synoptic Gospels. He begins by referring to two representative unbelieving works of last century, both of which attempted to discredit the historical character of the gospel narrative, specially the miraculous, by an analysis of their composition, and he indicates the large part played in estimating facts of this kind by subjective differences (*e.g.* the treatment by Mr. Podmore and Mr. F. W. Myers respectively of the data collected by the Society for Psychical Research). Taking for his text "The Gospel according to," and understanding by "Gospel" "What Jesus

said and did," the Professor devotes his attention to explaining by analogy of Moslem traditions the growth of such collections as we have in the first three Gospels. The reasons are set forth which probably led to the preference of oral over written record, of which the chief was probably avoidance of Jewish prejudice against all, and especially against rival, writings save their own sacred Scriptures. Such traditions he regards as possibly accurate at least for centuries, and points out how a start in writing once made crystallises all floating matter, not from motives of rivalry, but from desire to preserve omissions or more correct form. The process by which the fittest collections survive is then seen by reference to the first verses of St. Luke, in which the three functions of the traditionalist compiler are specified—viz. (i) transference of oral matter to writing, (ii) arrangement, (iii) criticism. This last term the lecturer understands as applied to the sources and channel from and through which the tradition has come. Differences in matter and omission may thus arise from special local retentions, or again from one compiler's dissatisfaction with the soundness of the chain of tradition, though the same story might have come quite soundly to another. Besides, in the use of oral tradition, discrimination is also made from the works of earlier collectors. The commemorative verses probably indicate original Aramaic matter; while homiletic and aphoristic sayings and a few precepts for conduct (*e.g.* Matt. xviii. 15), the reports of which would be characterised by brevity and variability, would form an early portion of written matter, the bulk would undoubtedly consist from the first of the matter taught to proselytes regarding Christ's story. Discrepancies here attest the multiplicity of witnesses. Attention is called to the element of indefinite uncertainty in regard to the translation of the didactic matter from the Aramaic, and our ignorance of the number of translations. The absence is noted of causes of fabrication—

the need of legal precedent, with which Christians were already supplied either by civil or Jewish code, and of authority for the moral and religious exhortations which is allowed by even the severest critics to be given in the lofty character of the original matter. In summing up the Professor affirms that even did our present Gospels belong to the second century and represent, as it were, rays repeatedly focussed, they would still be trustworthy accounts preserved by the rigid canons of oriental tradition, as known not only in Moslem rule, but as professed by St. Luke, and in the well-known statement of Papias on St. Mark's Gospel. Light as to the exact principles on which our present collections are compiled the speaker looks for from Egyptian discovery. He calls attention to the value of the repeated cross-examination by the best intellects, and believes that difference in the results (varying from the belief in absolute reconciliation of seeming discrepancies, through confidence in substantial truthfulness, notwithstanding errors of detail, to the reduction of the whole to a myth) will be ultimately explained by the doctrine of the "psychic spectrum" or subjective differences of opinion such as those already cited.

IV

The fourth address, by Mr. Welsh, opens with a reference to the threefold manner in which we meet Christianity,—through writings, traditional environment and individual experience,—and to Professor James's double criteria of immediate luminousness and moral helpfulness. Applying the former, the speaker briefly touches on the self-verifying character of the Christ-portrait in the Gospels and notes the logical importance of the demands of the moral nature, citing the well-known case of Ellen Watson, one of the first women students of University College. The moral criterion he

notes as itself the outcome of Christianity, and quotes many authors not professed Christians as to the effect of Christianity on a collective scale in the story of European advance and in missionary achievements. He distinguishes between Christianity and the official church. He admits present social corruption, to which, however, the powerful protest of the Christian minority is a standing witness for right unknown outside the Gospel. Even if Christianity be not admitted as the cause of moral improvement, but only as the companion of civilisation, its value would be thus assured, and the disintegrating effects of its loss make even unbelievers unwilling to part with its public acceptation. To account for the collective experience as a great delusion the lecturer considers impossible in the face of the constancy of the results under widespread variety of conditions. Passing to individual experience, the lecturer indicates the bulk, nature and continuousness of the phenomena as the data from which the Christian conclusion as to the power and reality of the living Christ is drawn, and asks how far it is valid for persons not the subjects. Dealing then with non-Christian explanations, the lecturer dismisses (1) the theory of medical materialism, which would equally explain the phenomena of disbelief and so answers itself; (2) the theory of personal caprice, which is refuted by the permanency, constancy, and universality of the data; (3) the theory of explosion from the sub-conscious self, which but throws the problem a step farther back and does not give the secret of the dynamic itself; (4) the theory of raised ethical standard, for this is non-existent in pagan lands, and is powerless to enforce itself in our own day; (5) the theory of playing upon the heart-strings of the fundamental emotions and passions, for this is done by modern realistic writers who expose what they cannot heal; (6) the theory that it is the mere embodiment of "truth in a tale" that touches the emotions, for this would go to show that the Incarna-

tion is powerful because the story is true; (7) and lastly, the theory that it is the idealised Christ who saves without any necessary reality in the story, for there was neither time historically for the idealising process to take place, nor has the ideal been operative when faith in the story has failed, the moral wrecks of sceptics known for their noble writings being adduced as indications of the tendency of such a condition. To the challenge that the noble lives of many unbelievers disprove the claims made for the living Christ, the speaker, allowing that there is much good outside the Gospel, points to the Christian environment and heredity from which these lives have sprung, and insists that individual instances are inadequate for proof on the unbelieving as on the Christian side, and require the test of a universal scale. Christian conclusion is then affirmed.

V

The fifth address, by Mr. Manley, puts the alternative between Christianity and Materialism, other historical systems being out of court. The position of the non-Christian theist is first examined, and is affirmed to force him into one of two directions: either, in the absence of a personal revelation, moral guidance is sought in the course of nature and the evolution of humanity, after a system which may be pantheistic in theory but is materialistic in practice; for the universal is non-ethical, and both systems deny ultimate moral distinctions and free-will, and lack sufficient motive power: or else (2), much more commonly, refuge is sought in professed Agnosticism; for as, on the whole, a vivid sense of God will gradually lead to Christ, so the rejection of Christ becomes denial of any adequate knowledge of God. The Christless contemplation of the world's sin and sorrow also leads to Agnosticism.

Against this theory, carefully distinguishing it from the position of the provisional inquirer, the speaker directs his attack. Here he first shows that, in all matters of practical pressure, indecision is negative decision, and cites Renan to show that Agnosticism means rejection of the claims of Christ. Huxley admits that he invented the term as a negation of the confidence of his neighbours, and while indignant at the charge of mere negation, offers nothing positive beyond the laws of Mechanics and Biology. Corroborative evidence is quoted from Spencer, and Agnosticism is pronounced covert Materialism. Having tracked the non-Christian theist through pantheism and Agnosticism into Materialism, Mr. Manley defines this creed, not as the acceptance of natural facts and laws, but as the affirmation of these data of Mechanics and Biology as a self-sufficient explanation of the world, and man, without a Father and a Saviour behind them. This creed is then cross-examined (1) on the possibility of salvation, to which it replies "save yourself"; (2) on moral guidance, to which it replies "consult nature"—answers which are riddled by the speaker. As to (3) the search for truth, Materialism is intellectual suicide, truth being but a by-product, a fragment of human imagination. Christianity, the creed of many great scientists, is then represented as asking only to be heard, there being no obstacle save the will. As with all theories, difficulties remain to Christianity also, but they are insufficient to justify disbelief in Christ. The higher must explain the lower—not conversely. Christ may explain matter, but not matter Christ.

VI

The sixth address, by Mr. Wilson, is epitomised and avowedly limited to a few suggestions on the Resurrection. Starting from the now universal admission of

the apostolic belief in the miracle itself, and the absurdity of the theory of imposture, the lecturer reviews other unbelieving explanations—the swoon theory, the hallucination theory, and the theory of psychic manifestation. The first he considers impossible without fraud, the second without greater lapse of time and proved conditions of expectancy, and the third he regards as meeting no difficulty, and involving inconsistent and inadequate conceptions of the power of Christ. There is also the difficulty of the missing body. The gospel assertion alone explains the admitted facts. The Pauline evidence from the four admitted epistles is then reviewed, and the sanity or epilepsy of the apostle discussed. The non-Judaic character of Christ's post-resurrection teaching, and the observance of the Christian Sunday, are also adduced as evidences of importance. The personal realisation of the living Christ is finally thrown back on individual experience.

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